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Abstract
Human decisions are strongly influenced by past experience or by the subjective values attributed to
available choice options. Although decision processes show some common trends across individuals,
they also vary considerably between individuals. The research presented in this dissertation focuses on
two domains of decision-making, related to learning and time preference, and examines factors that
explain decision-making differences between individuals. First, we focus on a form of reinforcement
learning in a dynamic environment. Across three experiments, we investigated whether individual
differences in learning were associated with differences in cognitive abilities, personality, and age.
Participants made sequential predictions about an on-screen location in a video game. Consistent with
previous work, participants showed high variability in their ability to implement normative strategies
related to surprise and uncertainty. We found that higher cognitive ability, but not personality, was
associated with stronger reliance on the normative factors that should govern learning. Furthermore,
learning in older adults (age 60+) was less influenced by uncertainty, but also less influenced by reward, a
non-normative factor that has substantial effects on learning across the lifespan. Second, we focus on
delay discounting, the tendency to prefer smaller rewards delivered soon over larger rewards delivered
after a delay. Delay discounting has been used as a behavioral measure of impulsivity and is associated
with many undesirable real-life outcomes. Specifically, we examined how neuroanatomy is associated
with individual differences in delay discounting in a large adolescent sample. Using a novel multivariate
method, we identified networks where cortical thickness varied consistently across individuals and brain
regions. Cortical thickness in several of these networks, including regions such as ventromedial prefrontal
cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, and temporal pole, was negatively associated with delay discounting.
Furthermore, this brain data predicted differences beyond those typically accounted for by other cognitive
variables related to delay discounting. These results suggest that cortical thickness may be a useful brain
phenotype of delay discounting and carry unique information about impulsivity. Collectively, this research
furthers our understanding of how cognitive abilities, brain structure and healthy aging relate to individual
differences in value-based decision-making.
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ABSTRACT
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN VALUE-BASED DECISION-MAKING:
LEARNING AND TIME PREFERENCE
Marieta Pehlivanova
Joseph W. Kable

Human decisions are strongly influenced by past experience or by the subjective values
attributed to available choice options. Although decision processes show some common
trends across individuals, they also vary considerably between individuals. The research
presented in this dissertation focuses on two domains of decision-making, related to
learning and time preference, and examines factors that explain decision-making
differences between individuals. First, we focus on a form of reinforcement learning in a
dynamic environment. Across three experiments, we investigated whether individual
differences in learning were associated with differences in cognitive abilities, personality,
and age. Participants made sequential predictions about an on-screen location in a video
game. Consistent with previous work, participants showed high variability in their ability
to implement normative strategies related to surprise and uncertainty. We found that
higher cognitive ability, but not personality, was associated with stronger reliance on the
normative factors that should govern learning. Furthermore, learning in older adults (age
60+) was less influenced by uncertainty, but also less influenced by reward, a nonnormative factor that has substantial effects on learning across the lifespan. Second, we
focus on delay discounting, the tendency to prefer smaller rewards delivered soon over
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larger rewards delivered after a delay. Delay discounting has been used as a behavioral
measure of impulsivity and is associated with many undesirable real-life outcomes.
Specifically, we examined how neuroanatomy is associated with individual differences in
delay discounting in a large adolescent sample. Using a novel multivariate method, we
identified networks where cortical thickness varied consistently across individuals and
brain regions. Cortical thickness in several of these networks, including regions such as
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, and temporal pole, was negatively
associated with delay discounting. Furthermore, this brain data predicted differences
beyond those typically accounted for by other cognitive variables related to delay
discounting. These results suggest that cortical thickness may be a useful brain phenotype
of delay discounting and carry unique information about impulsivity. Collectively, this
research furthers our understanding of how cognitive abilities, brain structure and healthy
aging relate to individual differences in value-based decision-making.
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CHAPTER 1 – Introduction
Value-based decision-making: examples and main effects vs. individual differences
In life, people make a multitude of decisions in the span of a single day, week, month, or
even across many years. Some of these decisions involve choices rooted in preferences,
such as choosing between spending available money now or saving for retirement or
future consumption (time preference); or choosing between a risky but possibly profitable
career move versus a less risky but also less beneficial alternative (risk preference); or
choosing between an option of narrow-self interest and an option that may benefit
another person or group (social preference). Alternatively, other decisions are more
strongly rooted in learning from past experience, through trial and error, such as
choosing a driving route based on previously experienced traffic and delays on specific
roads. A large effort in the research field of decision-making has focused on studying the
main effects of choices under different conditions, i.e. elucidating the behavioral
principles and neural mechanisms of how people make decisions. To this end, relevant
measures such as response rates, reaction times, or neural activation in response to task
stimuli are typically averaged between different experimental conditions, while interindividual variability is treated as idiosyncratic noise (Kanai & Rees, 2011). For example,
people tend to view losses more unfavorably than gains of the same magnitude, a
phenomenon called loss aversion (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).
Yet, one of the most consistent and salient observations in both everyday life and
scientific inquiry is that people differ from each other in a variety of ways. In everyday
1

life, some differences are easily and immediately observable (for example, height), while
others take time to uncover (e.g. personality or cognitive ability), and others may yet be
inconspicuous to the naked eye (e.g. brain size). Within the scientific study of decisionmaking, research has shown, for example, that people vary widely in the level of risk they
accept in life (Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002) or in the degree to which they can delay
gratification (Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989). The research presented in this
dissertation aims at furthering our understanding of cognitive and neuroanatomical
features that relate to individual differences in decision-making, specifically in the
domains of learning and time preference.
Sources of individual differences in differential psychology
Differences between individuals that relate to psychological and behavioral
characteristics have been studied within the purview of differential psychology. Here we
consider the following major domains of individual differences between humans:
cognitive abilities, personality and age (Kanai & Rees, 2011; Lubinski, 2000). One of the
most consequential dimensions of human variability is general intelligence, a factor that
subsumes variability in reasoning, mental processing speed, executive function and
memory, and is measured by the intelligence quotient (IQ). Higher IQ is associated with
higher educational achievement, successful job performance and functioning in modern
life (Gottfredson, 1997) and decreased mortality (Batty, Deary, & Gottfredson, 2007),
among other beneficial outcomes. Personality is another dimension of variability, with
one prominent model (“Big Five”) identifying five traits along which humans vary:
neuroticism, conscientiousness, agreeableness, extraversion, and openness (Costa &
2

McCrae, 1992). As measured by this model, personality is associated with differences in
job performance (Barrick & Mount, 1991), health behaviors (McAdams & Donnellan,
2009; Rhodes & Smith, 2006), and even political views (Gerber, Huber, Doherty, &
Dowling, 2011) and predicts mortality, divorce, and occupational attainment at least as
well as cognitive ability does (Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner, Caspi, & Goldberg, 2007).
Finally, both cognition and personality change across the lifespan (Craik & Bialystok,
2006; Specht, Egloff, & Schmukle, 2011), and healthy aging is generally associated with
changes in decision-making, resulting from changes in neurophysiology, cognitive
abilities and affective motivation (Samanez-Larkin & Knutson, 2015).
Over the past couple of decades, differential psychology has increasingly begun to
examine the brain anatomy and function underlying psychological differences among
individuals. This process has been facilitated by advances in neuroimaging and further
reinforced by discoveries that the individual difference factors described above may have
a neurobiological basis and a genetic component, thus giving rise to the field of
personality neuroscience (DeYoung & Gray, 2009). Indeed, general intelligence is linked
to structural brain differences in frontal, temporal, and parietal lobes—where more gray
matter or thicker cortex is associated with higher IQ— and is highly heritable (Deary,
Penke, & Johnson, 2010; Haier, Jung, Yeo, Head, & Alkire , 2004). The study of
personality has also yielded structural correlates of distinct Big Five traits (DeYoung et
al., 2010) and evidence of heritability (Riemann, Angleitner, & Strelau, 1997). Among
the above factors, perhaps the most significant source of neural variability is associated
with age, as the human brain undergoes dramatic changes through childhood and
3

adolescence (Giedd et al., 1999; Lenroot et al., 2007) to healthy old age (Buckner, 2004;
Raz et al., 2005).
The following section will discuss cognition, personality, and age as sources of
individual differences in specific decision-making tasks related to learning and time
preference.
Reinforcement learning and individual differences
Brief background on reinforcement learning
Much of human decision-making is based on learning from experience, through
trial and error, so as to avoid unpleasant outcomes and achieve desirable ones. This
phenomenon is known as reinforcement learning and has been robustly observed across
species beyond humans. Early explorations of such learning came from the field of
animal behavior. In a classical conditioning paradigm, an animal was repeatedly
presented with a pairing of an initially neutral and unconditioned stimulus and a reward,
such as food, which produces a natural response from the animal (Daw & Tobler, 2013;
Pavlov, 1927). After repeated exposure to this pairing, the animal develops an implicit
response to the (now conditioned) stimulus, even when the stimulus is presented without
the reward. It was proposed that the animal learns the conditioned response based on
comparisons between the observed reward and the expected/predicted reward based on
prior experience (Bush & Mosteller, 1951). The difference between the two is termed the
prediction error, and learning is greatest when that error is large. This observation gave
rise to the Rescorla-Wagner model of classical conditioning (Rescorla and Wagner,
4

1972). According to this model, the animal updates its predictions in the direction of the
prediction error and the extent of updating is governed by a parameter called the learning
rate (constrained between 0 and 1, where larger values indicate updating towards more
recent outcomes). Most of the work on the neural basis of reinforcement learning
computations has focused on prediction errors. Prediction error-like signals have been
associated with phasic activity of the midbrain dopamine neurons (Glimcher, 2011;
Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997); over the course of learning stimulus-reward
associations, dopamine neurons gradually become responsive to the reward-predicting
stimulus, rather than the reward itself (Schultz et al., 1997).
Adaptive learning
In this dissertation, we will focus on a specific form of reinforcement learning that
takes into account abrupt changes in the environment. Recent work has begun to
characterize the principles of learning specifically in a changing environment (Behrens et
al., 2007; Nassar et al., 2010; McGuire et al., 2014). We refer to such learning as
“adaptive” because it allows and requires adapting one’s rate of learning to the type of
environment. In a stable but noisy environment, long-run experience is the best predictor
of the future, and it is reasonable to maintain a low learning rate favoring the averaged
experienced outcomes (Behrens et al., 2007; Nassar et al., 2010). Conversely, in a
volatile environment, characterized by unexpected changes, recent experience is the best
predictor of the future, and it is reasonable to use a high learning rate such that the most
recently experienced outcome is weighted more heavily. In such learning paradigms,
people are generally sensitive to changes in the environment— they can detect volatility
5

and respond appropriately by using higher learning rates— but these adaptive tendencies
vary widely across individuals (Behrens et al., 2007; McGuire et al., 2014; Nassar et al.,
2010).
Individual differences in reinforcement learning
In this section, I will review literature on individual difference factors, as outlined
above, that have been found to explain variability in reinforcement learning.
Cognitive factors. Some work has been done in a framework that distinguishes
between two learning algorithms: “model-based” versus “model-free” learning. In this
framework, model-free learning relies on simply repeating actions that have previously
been rewarded without explicitly learning the structure of the reward environment (Daw,
Niv, & Dayan, 2005). This is the type of learning mechanism that is encoded in
dopaminergic neurons’ responses. In contrast, model-based learning relies on building a
sophisticated mental model of the reward environment, evaluating choices in the context
of that model, and flexibly updating one’s learning rate depending on the circumstances.
Otto and colleagues (2013, 2014) have recently shown that better working memory and
cognitive control are associated with increased reliance on model-based rather than
model-free learning. In addition, high working memory capacity protects individuals
against the deleterious effect of stress on model-based learning (Otto et al., 2013).
Neural factors. Some work has also identified a neural basis of individual
differences in reinforcement learning, specifically linked to the striatum, which is one of
the main target areas of dopamine neurons coding for prediction errors. In a reward
6

learning task, individuals who were able to learn the reward contingencies of the task
showed pronounced striatal activation in response to prediction errors, relative to those
who were unable to learn, and the magnitude of activation was positively associated with
performance across both groups (Schönberg, Daw, Joel, & O'Doherty, 2007). Another
study has directly linked individual differences in learning to differences in baseline
striatal dopamine synthesis capacity, such that individuals with high and low capacity
show distinct patterns of responses to learning from rewards versus punishments in a
reversal learning task (Cools et al., 2009).
In adaptive learning specifically, prior work has reported psychophysiological and
neural correlates of individual variability in learning. Pupil diameter tracks normative
learning factors derived from a computational model, and the degree of pupil metrics’
sensitivity to environmental statistics reflects the extent to which a person’s behavior was
influenced by these normative factors (Nassar et al., 2012). In an fMRI study, activity in
the anterior insula and dorsomedial frontal cortex, regions linked to arousal and salience
(Seeley et al., 2007), is modulated by these normative factors (McGuire et al., 2014).
Furthermore, the extent to which activity in anterior insula and dorsomedial frontal cortex
was modulated by these normative factors was associated with the extent to which a
person’s behavior was influenced by these same factors (McGuire et al., 2014).
Personality. The literature on personality factors that explain individual variability
in learning behavior is sparse. In particular, extraversion— a personality trait that has
been hypothesized to relate to dopamine function— is associated with individual
differences in learning, as measured by distinct EEG response patterns (Cooper, Duke,
7

Pickering, & Smillie, 2014; Smillie, Cooper, & Pickering, 2011). In an associative
learning task, more extraverted individuals show a greater difference in sensitivity
between unpredicted non-rewards and predicted rewards, compared to introverted
individuals (Cooper et al., 2014; Smillie et al., 2011).
Age. Reinforcement learning processes show age-related differences, with
children and older adults generally able to learn reward contingencies, but learning more
slowly and with more difficulty than adolescents and younger adults (Eppinger, Kray,
Mock, & Mecklinger, 2008; Eppinger, Mock, & Kray, 2009; Hämmerer, Li, Müller, &
Lindenberger, 2011). In old adults, some of these differences have been hypothesized to
result from age-related changes in the dopaminergic and serotonergic systems (Marschner
et al., 2005). Healthy aging is specifically associated with decreased sensitivity to reward
in a probabilistic learning task, which is neurobiologically mediated by reduced white
matter integrity in select prefrontal pathways (Samanez-Larkin et al., 2012).
Important open questions in individual differences in adaptive learning
As outlined above, most of the work on individual differences in reinforcement
learning has been done in paradigms that do not explicitly model fundamental changes in
the environment. Differentiating between variability due to changes as apposed to noise
is an important skill, and people vary in their degree of adaptability in dynamic
environments— some people are quick learners in the face of change, while others
require more time and experience to adapt. Given that most realistic environments
humans experience, such as relationships, the work place or financial markets, are rarely
stable over time, understanding factors that explain variability in individuals’ decision8

making in dynamic environments is important. Previous individual difference work in the
adaptive learning framework has indentified psychophysiological (Nassar et al., 2012)
and neural correlates (McGuire et al., 2014) of variability. However, differences have not
been examined in the context of other factors that are generally known to relate to interindividual variability, such as cognitive and personality factors. In addition, healthy aging
could be an important source of individual differences, as it is associated with changes in
personality (Roberts & Mroczek, 2008) and cognition (McArdle, Ferrer-Caja, Hamagami,
& Woodcock, 2002), possibly mediated by neurological age-dependent changes
(Marschner et al., 2005). Alternatively, age may play a role in adaptive learning
independently of changes in the above factors. The systematic study of these factors
together could be fruitful, as it will allow us to study the adaptive learning process in its
complexity. Accordingly, here we extend the study of individual differences in adaptive
learning by investigating the effect of cognitive abilities, personality, and age on learning
strategies.
Time preference: delay discounting and individual differences
In adaptive learning, the decision-maker is influenced by the past, and recent
outcomes compete with more distant ones to shape current expectations about the
environment. Next, we transition to another domain of decision-making— time
preference— where decisions are in turn based on the influence of the recent or
immediate versus distant future.
Introduction to delay discounting
9

In the domain of preference, this dissertation specifically focuses on time
preference which entails a choice between receiving something desirable soon and
receiving something desirable after some time. This type of decision is common in real
life and consists of a comparative evaluation of costs and benefits of options occurring at
different points in time. For example, a student has a choice between playing video
games now and using that time to study for the SAT, which might lead to a larger return
on investment in the future; an employee has a choice between using their discretionary
income for hobbies or leisure now or investing that income for larger future monetary
returns. Such intertemporal choices have been studied in the laboratory using a paradigm
called “delay discounting” (DD), which measures the degree to which people “discount”
the value of rewards received after a delay (Kirby, Petry, & Bickel, 1999). The DD task
consists of a series of questions of the type “Would you rather receive $10 now or $18 in
30 days?” By varying the amounts and delays, one can estimate the subjective discount
rate at which each individual devalues future outcomes. The discount rate (DR) estimates
the steepness of the reduction of present value with increases in delays. Individuals with
higher DRs are considered more impulsive, while individuals with low DRs are
considered patient. DD is particularly fruitful for the study of individual differences for
the following reasons: First, there exists large variability between individuals in the
degree of discounting. Second, behavioral variability on this lab task predicts variability
in many real-life behaviors, including addiction. Third, DD has been used extensively as
a measure of impulsivity.
Delay Discounting, real-life outcomes, and relation to impulsivity
10

A large body of literature has shown that discount rates measured in the lab
correlate with consequential real-life behaviors and outcomes. Higher discounting is
associated with relationship infidelity (Reimers, Maylor, Stewart, & Chater, 2009), lower
creditworthiness (Meier & Sprenger, 2012), and poor health habits and obesity (Amlung,
Petker, Jackson, Balodis, & MacKillop, 2016; Chabris, Laibson, Morris, Schuldt, &
Taubinsky, 2008). Conversely, lower discounting is associated with greater life
satisfaction (Becker, Deckers, Dohmen, Falk, & Kosse, 2012) greater social competence
in adolescents (Mischel et al., 1989), and higher GPA in college students (Kirby,
Winston, & Santiesteban, 2005). The largest literature on the real-life correlates of delay
discounting comes from the field of addiction research (see MacKillop et al., 2011 for a
meta-analysis and Reynolds, 2006 for a qualitative review). Higher discounting has been
reliably associated with smoking (Epstein et al., 2003; Reynolds, 2004; Reynolds,
Richards, Horn, & Karraker, 2004); with higher and/or problematic alcohol use
(Courtney et al., 2012; Petry, 2001a; Vuchinich & Simpson, 1998); with heroin and
cocaine addiction (Coffey, Gudleski, Saladin, & Brady, 2003; Kirby et al., 1999; Kirby &
Petry, 2004; Madden, Petry, Badger, & Bickel, 1997); and with pathological gambling
(Petry, 2001b). In the aggregate, greater discounting of future rewards appears to be
robustly related to less desirable outcomes, while low discounting appears to be
associated with more desirable outcomes.
Impulsivity is defined as a tendency to act without deliberation or adequate regard
for consequences (Evenden, 1999). DD has been proposed as a model of impulsivity,
where steady preference for immediate rewards is considered impulsive whereas steady
11

preference for delayed rewards is interpreted as a display of self-control (Ainslie, 1975).
DD has also specifically been proposed as a framework for understanding substance
abuse as an impulsive choice of an immediate reward over the more patient and
beneficial choice of abstinence (Bickel et al., 2007).
Individual differences in delay discounting
In this section, I will review individual difference factors that have been found to
explain variability in discount rates among people.
Cognitive factors. In relation to cognitive factors, lower discounting is robustly
associated with higher intelligence (Shamosh and Gray, 2008), and also with better
working memory (Shamosh et al., 2008; Bobova et al., 2009). As a potential neural
mechanism of these associations, Shamosh and colleagues (2008) found that working
memory-related activity in anterior prefrontal cortex partially mediates the relationship
between DD and IQ.
Personality. In contrast, relationships between personality traits and DD appear to
be less stable. High extraversion (characterized by an orientation towards people and
external events), high agreeableness (characterized by a tendency to act in a cooperative
manner), and low conscientiousness (characterized by a tendency to be less organized
and responsible) have been reported to predict steeper discounting (Anderson, Burks,
DeYoung, & Rustichini, 2011; Becker et al., 2012; Daly, Harmon, & Delaney, 2009;
Ostaszewski, 1996), though replication of these effects has been inconsistent (Becker et
al., 2012; Dohmen et al., 2010). Interestingly, some research has also examined the
12

interaction of cognitive abilities and personality in predicting discount rates (Hirsh,
Morisano, & Peterson, 2008). At the low end of the cognitive ability distribution, high
extraversion and low neuroticism, defined as emotional stability, predict higher
discounting, while at the high end extraversion has no effect and high neuroticism is
associated with steeper discounting (Hirsh et al., 2008). Traits related to time perception
also appear to play a role in temporal discounting (Kim & Zauberman, 2009): feeling
weak connectedness to one’s future self (Ersner-Hershfield et al., 2009a; 2009b) is
associated with steeper discounting. Both differences in time perception and future
connectedness have been associated with differences in brain activity (Cooper, Kable,
Kim, & Zauberman, 2013; Ersner-Hershfield et al., 2009b).
Age. Multiple studies have examined age as a source of individual differences in
DD. One of the earliest such investigations reported that young adults were lower
discounters than children but higher discounters than older adults, suggesting a linear
decrease in discounting across age groups (Green, Fry, & Myerson, 1994). Despite these
differences, though, the mechanism of choice in DD appears to be qualitatively similar
across age groups (Green et al, 1994). However, reports about discounting differences
between young and old adults are inconsistent. In addition to several studies reporting
that older adults are lower discounters compared to young adults (Eppinger, Nystrom, &
Cohen, 2012; Green et al., 1994; Reimers et al., 2009), there is evidence of old adults
being higher discounters (Read & Read, 2004), as well as reports of no differences
between these age groups (Chao, Szrek, Pereira, & Pauly, 2009; Samanez-Larkin et al.,
2011). Notably, Read and Read (2004) reported a curvilinear relationship between adult
13

age and DD, such that elderly adults (average age of 75) discounted more steeply than
young adults (average age of 25), with middle-aged adults (average age of 44) exhibiting
the lowest discount rates. In youth, age differences have been reported, such that younger
adolescents are higher discounters that older adolescents (Olson, Hooper, Collins, &
Luciana, 2007; Scheres et al., 2006; Steinberg et al., 2009).
Brain structure. A number of studies with adults have investigated individual
differences in DD in relation to neuroanatomy. Negative associations between gray
matter volume and discounting have been found in lateral prefrontal cortex (Bjork et al.,
2009), superior frontal gyrus (Schwartz et al., 2010), putamen (Dombrovski et al., 2012;
Cho et al., 2013); and positive associations have been found in posterior cingulate cortex
(PCC) and ventral striatum (Schwartz et al., 2010), medial prefrontal regions and anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC, Cho et al., 2013), middle frontal gyrus and frontal pole (Wang et
al., 2016). Decreased CT in medial prefrontal cortex and ACC is associated with higher
discounting (Bernhardt et al., 2014). Generally, these results have been inconsistent in
terms of directionality and regional specificity of effects, and might have been limited by
small or clinical samples, and region-of-interest analyses (for a review see Kable & Levy,
2015).
Important open questions in individual differences in delay discounting
The neurofunctional correlates of DD have been characterized extensively (Bartra,
McGuire, & Kable, 2013; Clithero & Rangel, 2013; Kable & Glimcher, 2007; Peters &
Büchel, 2011), and some research has begun to investigate its neurostrcutural correlates.
14

However, most of the previous work relating brain structure to DD has been conducted
with adult samples, and it is unclear whether documented age differences in DD might
also contribute to differences in neurostructural correlates. Such differences are
especially important to consider in relation to adolescence because this developmental
period is characterized by dramatic structural brain changes which may contribute to
increased impulsivity (Giedd et al., 1999; Sowell et al., 2004; Van Leijenhorst et al.,
2010), as well as changes in cognitive abilities, such as intelligence and executive
function (Blakemore & Choudhury, 2006; McArdle, Ferrer-Caja, Hamagami, &
Woodcock, 2002), which are associated with DD. In addition, delay discounting, as a
behavioral measure of impulsivity, has been associated with many risky behaviors, such
as reckless driving and alcohol abuse, which are an acute source of morbidity in
adolescence (Eaton et al., 2011). Here we extend the study of individual differences in
DD by investigating how differences in neuroanatomy, specifically cortical thickness,
relate to variability in discounting in adolescence.
Research overview
This dissertation specifically focuses on investigating individual differences in
two types of value-based decision-making processes: adaptive learning and delay
discounting. Both of these processes involve processing time-dependent information: in
learning, the decision-maker incorporates information from the past to accurately
estimate the current expectations about the environment, while in delay discounting the
decision-maker incorporates information about delays into the future. Conversely, the
processes differ in that adaptive learning is based on experienced outcomes, whereas
15

delay discounting is based on preference rather than experience. Understanding the
factors that contribute to individual differences in these processes is important because
successful functioning in the world depends on the abilities to detect changes in one’s
environment, delay gratification and accumulate resources for future consumption.
In Chapter 2, in a series of three behavioral experiments, we investigate whether
individual differences in adaptive learning are associated with differences in cognitive
abilities, personality, and age. In a simple video game task, participants make sequential
predictions about an on-screen location. This task provides trial-by-trial learning rate
estimates and has been successfully used in eliciting individual differences in learning
behavior (Nassar et al., 2010, 2012, 2016; McGuire et al., 2014). In addition, the task has
an underlying computational model, which has characterized two distinct normative
factors that should drive learning: change-point probability, which is related to how
surprising and unexpected a new outcome is, and relative uncertainty, which tracks the
reliability of the current beliefs about the state of the environment (Wilson et al., 2010;
Nassar et al., 2010, 2012). Consistent with previous work, we find that participants
exhibit common strategies in adaptive learning but also show large individual differences
in implementing these strategies. We find that increased cognitive ability is associated
with stronger reliance on the normative factors that should govern learning in this task. In
contrast, we find no reliable evidence that personality traits, including trait anxiety,
influence learning strategies in this dynamic environment. Furthermore, we find that
adaptive learning in older adults (age 60+) is less influenced by relative uncertainty, but
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also less influenced by reward, a non-normative factor that has substantial effects on
adaptive learning across the lifespan.
In Chapter 3, we examine neuronatomy, specifically cortical thickness, as a
source of individual differences in delay discounting in large sample of adolescents.
Using a novel multivariate method, we describe networks where cortical thickness varies
consistently across individuals and brain regions. Cortical thickness in several of these
networks of regions shows a negative relationship with impulsivity, such that diminished
cortical thickness is associated with greater discounting. The strongest effects were found
in regions typically implicated in delay discounting, such as ventromedial prefrontal
cortex and orbitofrontal cortex. Brain data predicted differences in discounting above and
beyond cognitive variables typically found to correlate with delay discounting.
Combined, these results suggest that cortical thickness may be a useful brain phenotype
of delay discounting and carry unique information about impulsivity.
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CHAPTER 2 — Age and cognitive abilities predict learning in a
dynamic environment

Abstract
People are adaptive learners in a changing environment and are able to update their
beliefs using relevant cues about the state of the world. Despite common trends in
behavior, there is great variability in participants’ learning strategies. Across three
experiments, we investigate cognitive abilities, personality, and age as potential sources
of these individual differences. In a simple video game task, participants made sequential
predictions about an on-screen location. This task provides estimates of trial-by-trial
learning rates and has been successfully used in eliciting individual differences in
learning behavior. In addition, the task has an underlying computational model, which
has characterized two distinct normative factors that should drive learning: change-point
probability, which is related to how surprising a new outcome is, and relative
uncertainty, which tracks the reliability of the current beliefs about the state of the
environment. Consistent with previous work, we found that participants exhibit common
strategies in adaptive learning but also show large individual differences in implementing
these strategies. We found that increased cognitive ability, and specifically better
memory performance, is associated with stronger reliance on the normative factors that
should govern learning in this task. In contrast, we found no reliable evidence that
personality traits influence learning strategies in a dynamic environment. Furthermore,
adaptive learning in older adults (age 60+) was less influenced by relative uncertainty,
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consistent with previous reports, but also less influenced by reward, a non-normative
factor that has substantial effects on adaptive

Introduction
Imagine dining at the same restaurant on repeated occasions and having delicious
meals, making it your favorite place to dine. Unexpectedly, on one particular occasion
they serve you a bad meal. Is this negative experience just an unfortunate exception in an
otherwise stable but noisy world, or does it indicate that something fundamental about the
restaurant has changed, such as a new chef? How much you should update your beliefs in
response to new experiences depends on the stability of the environment. In an
environment that is stable but noisy, long-run experience is the best predictor of the
future, and beliefs should be updated minimally in the face of new evidence (Behrens,
Woolrich, Walton, & Rushworth, 2007; Nassar, Wilson, Heasly, & Gold, 2010). In this
case, if a restaurant has a reliable and stable history with the same chef, it is sensible to
disregard the occasional negative experience if you have had a steady streak of good
meals there. Conversely, in a volatile environment, characterized by unexpected changes,
recent experience is the best predictor of the future, and beliefs should be updated more
rapidly in the face of new data (Behrens et al., 2007; Nassar et al., 2010). In this case, if a
restaurant has gone through many chef changes recently, a surprisingly negative
experience is more likely to mean that another change has occurred. Recent work has
shown that, while on average people follow these strategies, individuals differ
substantially in the extent to which they adhere to these principles of “adaptive learning”
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(Behrens et al., 2007; McGuire, Nassar, Gold, & Kable, 2014; Nassar et al., 2010).
However, the different factors that might influence these individual differences in
adaptive learning have not been systematically studied. Here we investigate cognitive
abilities, personality, and age as possible sources of these individual differences.
A learning model derived from Bayesian theory has characterized two distinct
normative factors that should drive learning in volatile environments, and individual
differences in adaptive learning can be described by variability in responding to these
normative factors (McGuire et al., 2014; Nassar, Bruckner, Gold, Li, Heekeren, &
Eppinger, 2016; Nassar, Rumsey, Wilson, Parikh, Heasly, & Gold, 2012; Nassar et al.,
2010; Wilson, Nassar, & Gold, 2010). The first factor, which we call change-point
probability, tracks the likelihood of a fundamental shift in the environment and is related
to how surprising and unexpected a new outcome is (Nassar et al., 2012). In the
restaurant example, a meal of unexpected quality, relative to one’s experience, might
suggest that something important about the restaurant has changed. The second factor,
which we call relative uncertainty, tracks the uncertainty, and thus reliability, of the
current beliefs about the state of the environment, and is related to the number of
observed outcomes consistent with the current state (Nassar et al., 2012). In the restaurant
example, the longer the streak of delicious meals, the more confident you are of the
quality of the meals under the current chef. Though on average individuals update their
beliefs in a dynamic environment according to both of these factors, there is large interindividual variability in doing so (Nassar et al., 2012; McGuire et al., 2014).
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What accounts for these individual differences in sensitivity to relevant
environmental cues? To date, studies have identified associations between individual
differences in adaptive learning and psychophysiological and neural activity linked to
arousal systems. Pupil diameter reflects both normative factors described above, with
evoked changes in pupil diameter tracking change-point probability and average baseline
pupil diameter tracking relative uncertainty (Nassar et al., 2012). Furthermore, the degree
of pupil metrics’ sensitivity to environmental statistics predicted the extent to which a
person’s behavior was influenced by the normative factors (Nassar et al., 2012). In an
fMRI study, activity in the anterior insula and dorsomedial frontal cortex, regions linked
to arousal and salience (Seeley et al., 2007), was modulated by both change-point
probability and relative uncertainty (McGuire et al., 2014). Furthermore, the extent to
which activity in anterior insula and dorsomedial frontal cortex was modulated by these
normative factors was associated with the extent to which a person’s behavior was
influenced by these same factors (McGuire et al., 2014).
Here we extend these findings in a series of three behavioral experiments
investigating whether individual differences in adaptive learning are associated with
differences in cognitive abilities, personality, and age. There are strong reasons to
hypothesize that each of these classic individual difference variables might influence
adaptive learning. Cognitive abilities are associated with individual differences in many
decision-making and learning tasks (Burks, Carpenter, Goette, & Rustichini, 2009; Otto,
Skatova, Madlon-Kay, & Daw, 2014; Shamosh & Gray, 2008) but have not been
explicitly studied in adaptive learning. Given that sensitivity to relevant cues from the
environment is associated with arousal responses (Nassar et al., 2012), personality and
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trait-based affect may influence adaptive learning. Indeed, a recent report links high trait
anxiety with a reduced ability to adjust learning between stable and volatile environments
(Browning, Behrens, Jocham, O'Reilly, & Bishop, 2015). Healthy aging is also associated
with changes in decision-making, resulting from changes in neurophysiology, cognitive
abilities and affective motivation (Samanez-Larkin & Knutson, 2015). In particular,
Nassar et al. (2016) have shown that learning from uncertainty in a dynamic environment
is reduced in older, relative to younger, adults. Here we systematically explore the
interplay of cognitive abilities, personality, and aging on adaptive learning.
Consistent with previous reports (Nassar et al., 2010, 2012; McGuire et al., 2014),
we found that people exhibited common strategies in adaptive learning, but also showed
large individual differences in implementing these strategies. We found that increased
cognitive ability, and specifically better memory performance, is associated with stronger
reliance on the normative factors that should govern learning in this task. In contrast, we
found no reliable evidence that personality traits, including trait anxiety, influence
learning strategies in a dynamic environment. Finally, we found that adaptive learning in
older adults (age 60+) is less influenced by relative uncertainty, consistent with previous
reports (Nassar et al., 2016), but also less influenced by reward, a non-normative factor
that has substantial effects on adaptive learning across the lifespan.

Experiment 1: Method
Participants. The experimental protocol was approved by the University of
Pennsylvania Internal Review Board. Informed consent was obtained from all
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participants. We recruited 49 participants for this experiment (age 18–34, M = 25.5, SD =
4.7; 33% males) from the University of Pennsylvania and the surrounding local
community. Inclusion criteria included comfort with using a right-handed trackball and
fluency in English. Exclusion criteria included a history of alcohol or drug abuse, major
psychiatric disorders not in remission for > 6 months, and current use of psychotropic
medications (including antidepressants, anxiolytics, and antipsychotics).
Procedure. Participants first completed a variant of a predictive inference task that
we have previously used to study adaptive learning, the “helicopter task,” which is
described in more detail below. Subsequently, participants’ IQ was assessed with the
similarities and matrix reasoning subtests of the Wechsler Abbreviated Intelligence Scale
(WASI; Wechsler, 1999). Finally, participants completed the Big Five Inventory-44
(John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991), Brief Sensation Seeking Scale (Hoyle, Stephenson,
Palmgreen, Lorch, & Donohew, 2002), and the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) trait
subscale (Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) via Qualtrics (Qualtrics
Labs Inc., Provo, UT). We also administered an intertemporal choice task (Senecal,
Wang, Thompson, & Kable, 2012) for exploratory purposes, and do not describe the
results of that task here. All tests were administered by the same experimenter (MP), in
the same manner, and in the same testing room. One notable exception to the
experimental protocol is that we started administering the STAI trait subscale mid-data
collection upon becoming aware of Browning et al.’s (2015) reported anxiety effects on
adaptive learning. We retroactively collected the anxiety data for the first half of our
sample via an online survey.
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Helicopter Task. Participants performed four blocks (150 trials each) of a
predictive-inference task in which learning rates can be tracked trial-by-trial (Nassar et
al., 2010, 2012, 2016; McGuire et al., 2014). The task was programmed in Matlab (The
MathWorks, Natick, MA) using MGL (http://justingardner.net/mgl) and snowDots
(https://code.google.com/archive/p/snow-dots/) extensions. On every trial, participants
made a prediction about the mean of an underlying generative distribution based on
observed random draws from that distribution. The task was presented as a computer
game with the following description: a helicopter in the sky drops a bag of coins on each
trial; once the bag reaches the ground, it turns into a coin explosion, and the participant’s
job is to position a bucket on the ground prior to the bag fall to collect as many coins as
possible (Figure 1A). Importantly, the helicopter is hidden in clouds, so participants must
use previously observed bag drop locations to infer the helicopter’s position. Participants
made trial-by-trial predictions about the location of the helicopter by positioning the
rectangular bucket using a trackball. At the beginning of every trial, the bucket was repositioned to its default position in the middle of the screen. Once a participant submitted
their prediction, they could not move the bucket until the bag-drop outcome was realized.
Participants were instructed that the best strategy to maximize earnings is to position the
bucket directly underneath the helicopter, even when the helicopter is obscured by
clouds, thus implicitly discouraging guessing of individual bag drop locations.
Participants received feedback on every trial in the form of a red bar spanning the
difference between the bag drop location and the selected bucket position, indicating the
prediction error (PE). This feedback was added to minimize the working memory burden
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in this inference problem. The helicopter location changed occasionally, without warning,
giving rise to unsignaled change points (CPs).
Possible bag drop and bucket locations were mapped onto arbitrary screen units
valued from 0 to 300. Bag drop locations were drawn at random from a Normal
distribution around the center of the helicopter. The mean of the distribution, and thus the
helicopter position, was held fixed on most trials (with 100% probability for the first 3
trials in a new location). Occasionally there were unsignaled change points: with a .125
probability after the third stable trial, the mean of the generative distribution was redrawn from a uniform distribution on (0, 300). The standard deviation of the distribution
of bag drops varied between blocks and was set to either 10 or 25 screen units, creating
different levels of noise in the environment. Participants were instructed to think of this
noise as different strengths of “wind” which occasionally blew the bags away from the
center of the helicopter. The width of the bucket scaled with the strength of the wind, and
was set to 2.5 and 2.2 times the SD of the bag drop distribution, in the low and high wind
conditions, respectively. The width of the bucket was chosen to balance earnings between
different noise blocks, and the set of other parameter values were chosen based on
simulations seeking to maximize the difference in payoff between an approximately
Bayesian learning model (described below) and an observer that uses the simple strategy
of placing the bucket at the location of the last bag drop. The main part of the task
consisted of four blocks (150 trials each) alternating in wind strength, with the type of the
first block (low vs. high wind/noise) counterbalanced across participants.
The task also included a manipulation of reward with each bag containing one of
two colors of coins, determined independently at random with 50% probability on each
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trial. For half the participants, yellow coins were rewarded and gray coins were
unrewarded. For the remaining participants, the colors were flipped with gray coins being
rewarded and yellow coins being unrewarded. The rewarded color was also
counterbalanced across participants and participants were assigned to one of the four
conditions obtained by crossing the factors initial noise level and rewarded color.
Participants were told which color would be rewarded, and were specifically instructed
that (1) they will not see the coin color until after they have made a bucket prediction and
observed the bag fall; (2) the color of the coin should not influence their strategy in the
game. All rewarded coins gathered were redeemed for money. Participants received
feedback after each block in the form of a percentage score indicating the participant’s
earnings relative to earnings obtained by the approximate Bayesian learning model
described in the following section.
Prior to the four experimental blocks, participants completed a training session
that was more extensive than in earlier versions of the task (Nassar et al., 2012; McGuire
et al., 2014). The training built understanding of the environment by gradually
introducing more complexity, such as wind, clouds and changes in the helicopter’s
position. In the first training block, the helicopter was visible, fixed and the bag always
dropped right underneath the helicopter (i.e. no wind); participants were simply required
to repeatedly position the bucket underneath the helicopter to ensure they can manipulate
the trackball. This first block was performed to criterion: 15 consecutive trials where the
center of bucket was positioned within 12 screen units of the helicopter position. In the
second training block of 25 trials, a distribution of bag drops with SD = 10 units around
the helicopter center was introduced and explained to participants as “wind.” The third
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block was 35 trials of a “windier” condition with SD = 25 units and a larger bucket,
conditions that were maintained throughout the remainder of the training session. In the
fourth block of 40 trials we introduced clouds on about half the trials (randomly
determined on each trial); the clouds obscured the stationary helicopter from view. In the
following two blocks of 50 trials each it was cloudy at all times, so participants never saw
the helicopter and had to infer its position based on observed bag drops. In the next block
of 50 trials the clouds were fully removed to make visible occasional shifts of the
helicopter (i.e., change points were added). In the final training block of 60 trials,
participants experienced high wind, clouds at all times, and occasional change points, and
the only difference from the experimental blocks was that there was only one type of
coin. The unrewarded coins of different color were introduced in the main experimental
blocks. Participants did not earn money from the training session.
Normative Model. We used a well-described approximately Bayesian belief
updating model to simulate (nearly) optimal performance in the helicopter task (Nassar et
al., 2010, 2012, 2016; McGuire et al., 2014). The model computes trial-by-trial estimates
of the location of the helicopter in the form of a delta-rule (Nassar et al., 2010, 2012,
2016):

Bt+1 = Bt + α t × δ t

(1)

δ t = X t − Bt

(2)
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where Bt and Bt+1 are beliefs about the current and next locations of the helicopter,
respectively, Xt is the current observed bag drop, δt is the prediction error for the current
trial, and at is the learning rate.
The ideal observer infers the position of the helicopter, i.e., the mean of the
distribution generating bag drops, from the positions of previously observed bag drops
according to:

p( µt X1:t ) =

p(X1:t µt ) p( µt )
p(X1:t )

(3)

where μt is the position of the helicopter on trial t, and X1:t denotes the locations of bag
drops observed on trials 1 through t.
The model posits that trial-by-trial learning rates are driven by two factors
computed on every trial from the sequence of experienced bag drop locations (Figure 1B;
Nassar et al., 2012, 2016). The first factor is change point probability (CPP, denoted as
Ω), which measures the probability of the helicopter having switched locations since the
last trial, given the observed prediction error. The second factor is relative uncertainty
(RU, denoted as τ), which estimates the uncertainty in the exact location of the helicopter
(often caused by a recent change point) as a function of the total uncertainty about the
next bag drop.
Trial-by-trial learning rate is computed according to:

(4)
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Learning accelerates and favors recent outcomes when the estimated likelihood of
a change point is high or when the uncertainty in the precise location of the helicopter is
high. The effect of RU in determining the learning rate is highest when CPP is zero and,
conversely, the effect of CPP is highest when uncertainty about the mean of the
generative distribution is low.
In a recent instantiation of this normative model (Nassar et al., 2016), these two
factors are computed recursively by first estimating RU as follows:

(5)

where Ωt , τt, and δt are, respectively, the change point probability, relative uncertainty
and prediction error on the previous trial; σN is the standard deviation of the bag drop
distribution (previously defined as “noise”). The numerator of Equation 5 denotes the
variance of the predictive distribution over possible helicopter locations, and includes
terms for the variability in the bag drop distribution (σN) weighted under conditions of a
recent change point or a stable environment, respectively, as well as an adjustment term
for the variance arising from the difference in means of these distributions (McGuire et
al., 2014). The denominator in Equation 5 includes all the terms in the numerator, plus a
term to account for the remaining total uncertainty, namely uncertainty arising strictly
from variability in the distribution of bag drops (σN). Total uncertainty in bag locations in
this environment is attributable to both uncertainty about the center of the helicopter
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(numerator) and uncertainty about the standard deviation of the bag drop distribution
around the helicopter center. Accordingly, RU is calculated as the proportion of total
uncertainty about the next bag location that is due to having an imprecise estimate of the
location of the helicopter (McGuire et al., 2014; Nassar et al., 2016).
To calculate CPP, the model considers whether the generative mean has been
resampled. The overall probability of resampling is called the Hazard rate, denoted by H.
CPP on every trial is then computed from H, relative uncertainty (τt), SD of the bag drop
distribution (σN) and the current prediction error (δt) as follows (Nassar et al., 2012,
2016):

Ωt =

U(Xt 0, 300)H
U(Xt 0, 300)H + N(δt 0, σ N2 1− τ t )(1− H )

(6)

where U(Xt|0,300) represents the probability of the current observation being randomly
drawn from the possible helicopter locations and N(δt|0, σ2N/1- τt) is the likelihood of
observing the current prediction error under the current predictive distribution. In
principle, CPP is higher as the base-rate of change points increases; however, H in our
experiment was held fixed throughout. Thus, CPP only depended on how unlikely an
observed prediction error was under the current beliefs.
We obtained trial-by-trial estimates of CPP and RU by fitting the model to the
sequences of experienced prediction errors using the true values of the hazard rate (H =
0.125) and noise in the generative distribution (SD = 10 or 25).
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Behavioral Analysis. We used linear regression to test the effect of normative
model factors and the non-normative reward factor on participants’ trial-by-trial bucket
updates, an analysis strategy successfully used in recent work with this task (McGuire et
al., 2014; Nassar et al., 2016). Specifically, our analysis of task behavior was closely
modeled after that used by Nassar and colleagues (2016). In other work with this task
(Nassar et al., 2010, 2012, 2016), the normative model was alternatively, or additionally,
fit to subjects’ bucket predictions to infer latent variables, such as the baseline rate of
change points. In contrast, here we simulated normative influences on behavior (trial-bytrial CPP and RU; by fitting the normative model to the sequence of observed bag drops),
and examined how those relate to actual participant behavior.
We fit the regression models explaining behavior separately for each participant,
combining data from all 4 experimental blocks. Each model included the following
independent variables calculated for each trial: prediction error and the interaction
between prediction error and CPP, RU, an indicator variable for noise (the SD of the bag
distribution), reward value (1 for rewarded trial and 0 for non-rewarded trial), and the
quadratic weighted distance from screen center (to adjust for bias towards the default
bucket position in the center of the screen). All predictors were mean-centered. As
discussed in Nassar et al. (2016), residuals from this regression scale with prediction
errors, such that they are larger with larger absolute errors. To account for this violation
of regression assumptions, we used weighted linear regression, as described in Nassar et
al. (2016). In an initial regression, we estimated the variance of residuals in sliding
windows of prediction error. The variance estimates were used to weight errors; in
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addition, a ridge penalty was applied to shrink estimated coefficients. We used a sliding
window method, where data were binned based on relative prediction error (absolute
prediction error divided by the SD of the bag drop distribution), which indexed surprise.
We applied the binning to account for a non-monotonic relationship between updating
and surprise. Each bin contained 10% of the total data and bins were incremented by one
percentile of the data. For further details on analysis strategy, refer to Nassar et al.
(2016).
The regression coefficients for each independent variable in the above-described
model were taken as the effects of each factor on the participant’s updates. Group effects
across participants for each factor were tested against zero using Wilcoxon signed-rank
tests. We then tested the CPP, RU and reward effects for association with personality and
cognitive variables of interest. In our and previous studies (McGuire et al., 2014), the
CPP and RU effects were strongly positively correlated; we therefore averaged them into
a “Normative Learning Factor” (NLF) to use in a first step analysis and minimize the
number of tests conducted. We used separate regression models with NLF as the
dependent variable and either the cognitive or personality factors as independent
variables to test the separate associations with personality and cognition. We used F-tests
to formally compare a full model of personality and cognitive predictors to a nested
model with just the cognitive variable, IQ, thus testing if personality predicts normative
learning above and beyond cognition.
Although the CPP and RU effects are strongly conceptually and quantitatively
related, prior work has also shown some distinctions between the two (McGuire et al.,
2014; Nassar et al., 2016). In cases where we found significant associations with
32

normative learning, we further unpacked these effects by looking at bivariate correlations
between the CPP and RU effects and the significant individual difference variables. We
used Spearman’s rho for all reported correlations, to account for slight non-normality,
especially in the cognitive and personality variables.

Experiment 1: Results
In this experiment, we investigated whether cognitive or personality factors explain
individual differences in adaptive learning in young participants.
Model-free analyses showed that participants’ learning was sensitive to normative
model factors. Specifically, we examined if trial-by-trial learning was responsive to: (1)
different magnitudes of spatial prediction error, and (2) sudden changes in the
environment.
Both of these factors have previously been shown to influence belief updating in a
changing environment (Nassar et al., 2010, 2012). Consistent with previous findings,
participants’ learning rates increased monotonically as the prediction error increased, in
both low- and high-noise blocks (Figure 2A). Learning rates were also higher in the lownoise blocks than in the high-noise blocks for an equivalent PE magnitude (Figure 2A;
median p across prediction error bins < .0001). Combined, these results show that
participants are sensitive to CPP, as CPP increases with prediction error and is greater for
low noise than high noise for a fixed PE (Nassar et al., 2012). Also consistent with
previous findings, participants used the highest learning rates on trials right after a change
point, and learning rates decreased steeply thereafter, stabilizing around the third trial
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post change point (Figure 2B). This result shows that participants are also sensitive to
RU, as RU peaks after a change point and declines thereafter (Nassar et al., 2012).
We used model-based analyses to further quantify how behavior depended on
both normative and other incidental factors (Nassar et al., 2016). Trial-by-trial bucket
update was the dependent variable, and the regression model included trial-wise PE, and
the interaction between PE and CPP, RU, and reward as independent variables. The
regression coefficients are a measure of the influence of that factor on each participant’s
learning behavior, controlling for the influence of the other factors in the regression
model. Consistent with previous reports (McGuire et al., 2014; Nassar et al., 2016),
participants, as a group, made larger updates based on both CPP (Mdn = 0.37, Q1 = 0.22,
Q3 = 0.50) and RU (Mdn = 0.19, Q1 = 0.07, Q3 = 0.32), with both group effects being
significantly different from zero (Z = -6.02 and Z = -5.03, respectively, ps < .0001; Figure
2C). Consistent with their normative roles, both CPP- and RU-based updating were
positively correlated with total number of coins earned (rho = .70, p < .0001 and rho =
.44, p = .002, respectively).
Participants’ learning was not fully accounted for by the normative model,
however. The normative model posits that learning is fully driven by CPP and RU
(Nassar et al., 2012; 2016). In contrast, participants reliably updated based on the
observed spatial prediction error alone, with higher PE engendering larger bucket updates
(Mdn = 0.61, Q1 = 0.50, Q3 = 0.71, Z = -6.09, p < .0001). The regression coefficient on
PE alone captures a tendency to rely on a fixed learning rate instead of learning
adaptively according to the changing environment. Indeed, the tendency to update based
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on PE alone is strongly negatively correlated with the tendency to update based on CPP
or RU (rho = -.91 and rho = -.58, respectively, ps < .0001).
Participants’ belief updating was also influenced by reward: participants updated
more after trials with rewarded versus unrewarded coins (Mdn = 0.06, Q1 = 0.01, Q3 =
0.10, Z = -5.00, p < .0001). Reward-based updating is non-normative in our task because
the value of coins in each bag does not carry information about the distribution of bag
locations. Accordingly, the reward effect was negatively correlated with number of coins
earned (rho = -.29, p = .046), with those who were more influenced by bags with
rewarded coins performing worse on the task.
As is clear in Figure 2C, however, there were individual differences in the degree
of normative updating. These individual differences were associated with cognitive but
not personality measures. We used regression models to test the association between
cognitive and personality factors and normative learning. The two normative behavioral
effects, CPP and RU, were strongly positively correlated across participants (rho = .58, p
< .0001; McGuire et al., 2014). Thus, to reduce the number of tests conducted, we used
the average of the two effects (the “Normative Learning Factor”, NLF) as a dependent
variable in the regression. A model with just IQ significantly predicted NLF (Table 1,
F(1,47) = 6.82, p = .012), while a model only using personality measures did not
significantly predict NLF (F(7,41) = 0.78, p = .61). A formal comparison of the full
model (including cognitive—IQ—plus all personality measures) to a nested model with
just IQ indicated that the nested model fits our data better than the full model (F(7,40) =
0.63, p = .73). Higher IQ was associated with more adaptive learning (higher NLF, Table
1, t(47) = 2.61, p = .012) and higher IQ was directly associated with better performance
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(i.e., more total coins caught) in the game (rho = .50, p = .0003). To further unpack the
effects of IQ, we examined the correlation between IQ and the normative model-based
factors separately (CPP and RU). IQ was moderately positively correlated with both
CPP- and RU- based updating (rho = .38, p = .006 and rho = .32, p = .027, respectively;
Figures 2D and 2E), with higher IQ participants being more sensitive to these modelbased factors.
However, IQ did not predict reward-based updating (F(1,47) = 0.49, p = .49;
Figure 2F). Reward-based updating was also not significantly associated with personality
measures (including “Big Five” dimensions of personality, sensation seeking, and trait
anxiety; F(7,41) = 0.69, p = .68).

Experiment 1: Discussion
Experiment 1 demonstrated that learning behavior in a dynamic environment is
influenced by normative factors from an approximate Bayesian model, and individual
differences in normative learning correlate with cognitive abilities but not personality
traits. Specifically, trial-by-trial surprise (CPP) and belief uncertainty (RU) increase
learning from the most recent outcome (as shown previously in McGuire et al., 2014),
and higher IQ participants show more sensitivity to these normative factors. Participants’
learning is also improperly influenced by incidental reward (McGuire et al., 2014);
however, this tendency shows no association with cognitive abilities or personality.
Cognitive abilities are an important source of individual differences and have
been associated with decision-making across a variety of tasks. Cognitive abilities are
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robustly correlated with temporal discounting—the tendency to devalue future rewards—
with higher IQ individuals exhibiting less discounting of delayed rewards (Shamosh &
Gray, 2008). IQ is also associated with consistency in risky decisions, and in general with
higher willingness to take calculated risks, perhaps due to an increased capacity to
evaluate different options (Burks et al., 2009). Successful performance in our task
requires inferring the underlying statistical structure of the environment from noisy
evidence. Accurate inference could rely on cognitive abilities in a variety of different
ways: it may reflect the ability to integrate abstract information from different sources
(wind and helicopter movement; Gottfredson, 1997), or to actively maintain a
representation of the environment, focusing attention on relevant information while
ignoring the interference of noise (Kane & Engle, 2002). That is, though we observed a
relationship between adaptive learning and IQ, measures of IQ do not isolate a single,
specific cognitive process. Therefore, the relationship we observed might be traceable to
the effects of specific cognitive processes, such as memory, which are correlated with IQ
(Ackerman, Beier, & Boyle, 2005). We therefore examined associations with measures of
more specific cognitive processes, in addition to the more general measure of IQ, in the
following two experiments.
We investigated several dimensions of personality (“Big Five” dimensions of
personality, sensation seeking, and trait anxiety), and we did not find any association
between personality traits and adaptive learning. We had hypothesized that traits such as
neuroticism or anxiety might increase participants’ perceived rate of change points, and
thus lead to overall increased learning rates (Nassar et al., 2012). High trait anxiety has
been associated with reduced adjustment of learning rates between stable and volatile
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periods in an aversive learning task (Browning et al., 2015). A notable difference
between their study and ours—that might explain why we do not see an association with
anxiety—is that they used anxiety-provoking electrical shocks as stimuli.
In the next experiment, we set out to investigate if individual differences in
adaptive learning are attributable to similar cognitive (versus personality) factors in a
sample of elderly adults. This would replicate the findings of Experiment 1 and
demonstrate their generalizability across the lifespan. Healthy aging itself might also
influence performance in our task. Advanced age is associated with a decline in the
ability to learn changing reward contingencies (Eppinger, Hämmerer, & Li, 2011), and a
recent study with a different version of our predictive inference task showed that older
participants exhibited a decreased sensitivity to uncertainty compared to young adults
(Nassar et al., 2016).

Experiment 2: Method
In Experiment 2, we extended our investigation of cognitive and personality
factors that influence adaptive learning in a sample of cognitively healthy older adults.
Below (after Experiment 3), we will also use these data to consider healthy aging as a
source of individual differences in adaptive learning by comparing performance between
older and younger adults.
Participants. We recruited 41 cognitively healthy older participants (age 60–84, M
= 71.2, SD = 6.3; 32% males). Exclusion criteria were identical to those used in
Experiment 1; inclusion criteria were further restricted to older adults who had been
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screened as cognitively normal in the past 2 years. To this end, participants were
recruited from a pool of cognitively normal controls followed as part of a larger
longitudinal study at the University of Pennsylvania’s Alzheimer’s Disease Core Center
(ADCC). All controls undergo longitudinal medical, neurologic and psychiatric
assessments, as well as a standard battery of psychometric measures, including those
described by the National Alzheimer’s Coordinating Center’s (NACC) Uniform Data Set
(UDS; Morris et al., 2006). Additional psychometric measures included the Mini Mental
State Examination (Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975), Boston Naming Test
(Williams, Mack, & Henderson, 1989), Trail Making Test (Crowe, 1998), Wechsler Digit
Span Test (Wechsler, 1997), and the Consortium to Establish a Registry for Alzheimer’s
Disease (CERAD) Word List Memory Test (Morris et al., 1989). Designation of
cognitively normal is determined by a consensus group of neurologists, geriatricians,
neuropsychologists, and psychiatrists at the ADCC. Data from three participants were
excluded because the participants were unable (N = 2) or refused (N = 1) to finish the
task, so the effective sample size for analysis was 38 participants.
Procedure. The experimenter, order of administration, and training session were
the same as in Experiment 1, but there were several slight differences in procedure.
Starting with the sixth participant, to reduce task fatigue, we cut the number of trials in
each experimental block from 150 to 100 (a 33% reduction). We collected the same
personality measures as in Experiment 1, except for the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory
(STAI) trait subscale (Spielberger et al., 1983). We offered participants the option to
complete the questionnaires on paper in order to minimize computer use; five participants
chose this option.
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Although we did not collect any additional data from older adults at the time of
testing, we were able to acquire measures of cognitive performance collected as part of
their participation in the ADCC. Psychometric testing was performed within a median of
119 days (4 months) of testing in our experiment. Here, we specifically focus on the
following measures: (a) total score from the Mini Mental State Examination, a
questionnaire of cognitive impairment including questions about orientation,
concentration, memory, and language; (b) total score from the Boston Naming Test, a test
of identification of 30 objects presented as line drawings; (c) two timing measures from
the Trail Making Test, a test of visual attention, processing speed, and mental flexibility.
Participants are asked to sequentially connect 25 dots. In Part A, all dots contain numbers
from 1 to 25, whereas Part B consists of alternating numbers and letters (1, A, 2, B, etc.).
The timing measures for each part indicate time to successful completion of the task; (d)
scores from the Wechsler Digit Span Test, a measure of short term memory. Participants
are verbally presented with lists of digits and asked to repeat the digits in the presented
order (forward test) or in reverse order (backward test). The number of digits increases by
one until a participant fails two trials of the same length, such that scores indicate highest
successfully repeated span lengths in each direction. (e) two memory measures derived
from the Word List Memory task, a working memory and learning task. Participants are
presented with a list of 10 high-frequency words which are read to them at a constant rate
of 1 word every 2 seconds. The word list is presented 3 consecutive times, in randomized
order. After every presentation, participants are asked to recall the words and responses
are recorded. The first measure of memory performance is the total number of words
immediately recalled across all three presentations (maximum is 30). The second measure
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of memory performance is the total number of words recalled out of 10 after a delay. For
one participant, Trail Making B score was not available at the time of collecting the other
psychometric measures; we instead used a score obtained a year earlier. We note that
reported results did not change when using a Trail Making B score imputed from other
available cognitive variables.

Experiment 2: Results and Discussion
Model-free analyses in Experiment 2 revealed similar influences on learning rates
as in Experiment 1 and previous reports (Nassar et al., 2010, 2012). Participants used
higher learning rates with higher spatial prediction error and lower noise (Figure 3A;
median p across prediction error bins = .0082), suggesting that learning was sensitive to
the normative CPP factor (Nassar et al., 2012). Average learning rates peaked right after
a change point and stabilized within three trials (Figure 3B), consistent with the
normative influence of RU (Nassar et al., 2012).
Model-based analyses further corroborated that older participants’ learning was
sensitive to normative factors (Figure 3C; McGuire et al., 2014). Older participants, as a
group, made larger updates based on the two normative factors, CPP (Mdn = 0.33, Q1 =
0.22, Q3 = 0.47, Z = -5.36, p < .0001) and RU (Mdn = 0.18, Q1 = -0.02 , Q3 = 0.31, Z = 2.99, p = .003). As with the younger participants in Experiment 1, the behavior of older
participants in Experiment 2 also systematically departed from the normative model.
Older participants’ updates showed a residual effect of observed spatial PE (Mdn = 0.65,
Q1 = 0.47, Q3 = 0.71, Z = -5.37, p < .0001), suggesting that participants had some
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tendency towards fixed learning rates rather than adapting learning rates based solely on
CPP and RU. Reward also influenced belief updating: older participants updated more
after trials with rewarded versus unrewarded coins (Mdn = 0.02, Q1 = -0.01, Q3 = 0.04, Z
= -2.53, p = .011).
Similar to our results in young adults, individual differences in adaptive learning
in older adults were more strongly associated with cognitive than personality measures.
We again examined the separate effects of cognitive (IQ and cognitive performance) and
personality variables (“Big Five” personality and sensation seeking) on the Normative
Learning Factor (average of CPP and RU). A model with cognitive measures alone
significantly predicted NLF (Table 2, F(9,28)= 3.17, p = .009), while a model with only
personality measures did not significantly predict NLF (F(6,31) = 0.47, p = .82). The
nested model with just cognitive variables was preferred over the full model with both
cognitive and personality variables (F(6,22) = 1.25, p = .32). In this regression model,
unlike in the sample of young adults in Experiment 1, IQ was not a significant predictor
of adaptive learning (Table 2, t(28) = -0.767, p = .45). However, several other cognitive
variables were significantly associated with adaptive learning (Table 2). Namely, two
measures of memory performance— Digit Span forward score (t(28) = 2.54, p = .017)
and Total Recall from the Word List Memory task (t(28) = 2.05, p = .049) — as well as
Trail Making B score (t(28) = 2.05, p = .0498).
Unpacking these cognitive effects on adaptive learning, we found that Total
Recall was positively correlated with both CPP- and RU-based updating (rho = .42, p =
.009; Figure 3D and rho = .45, p = .004; Figure 3E, respectively), while the other two
variables— Digit Span forward score (rho = .25, p = .14 and rho = .28, p = .09,
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respectively) and Trail Making B score (rho = .0004, p = .99 and rho = .17, p = .30,
respectively)— did not reach significance when examined separately for CPP- and RUbased updating and independently of other cognitive variables. Participants with better
memory (Total Recall) made updates that were more sensitive to the model-derived
normative factors that should govern learning. We note, however, that memory was not
directly correlated with better performance (i.e., total number of coins caught) in the
game (rho = .13, p = .45). In contrast to normative learning, cognitive abilities (including
memory performance) in older adults were not associated with non-normative rewardbased updating (F(9,28) = 1.54, p = .18; Figure 3F). As in Experiment 1, none of the
personality measures were significantly associated with any of the factors influencing
belief updating (F(6,31) = 0.58, p = 0.75).
Similar to what we observed in younger adults in Experiment 1, in Experiment 2,
older adults’ learning in a dynamic environment was influenced by both normative
factors, CPP and RU (Nassar et al., 2012), as well as a non-normative factor, outcome
reward (McGuire et al., 2014). Also as in Experiment 1, the effect of normative factors
on adaptive learning in older adults was associated with differences in cognitive abilities
and not with differences in personality. Combined, these two experiments suggest that
cognitive factors have a stronger influence than personality on individual differences in
adaptive learning.
However, the specific cognitive factors that were associated with normative
learning differed across the two experiments. While in younger adults in Experiment 1
adaptive learning was linked to IQ (the only cognitive measure collected), in older adults
in Experiment 2, individual differences in adaptive learning were correlated with memory
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but not with IQ. One possible explanation is that the different findings in the two
experiments are due to differences in IQ between the two samples. Even though median
IQ in the young sample was quite high (Mdn = 117, 87th percentile of the IQ
distribution), median IQ in the older sample was significantly higher (Mdn = 124.5, 95th
percentile, Z = 2.61, p = .009). The extremely high level of cognitive ability in our
sample of older adults is not too surprising, given that highly functioning older adults
may be more likely to volunteer to participate in research, and that our recruitment
specifically excluded individuals with cognitive impairments (see Method section), which
might be common and go undiagnosed in a more representative sample of that age. It is
possible that the association between IQ and adaptive learning might be obscured by
restricted range of IQ in our sample of older adults.
Another possibility is that individual differences in adaptive learning might be
driven by a specific aspect of cognitive function, which is generally correlated with the
broader statistical concept of IQ (which would explain the association we observed
between IQ and adaptive learning in young adults), but is dissociated from IQ in our
sample of older adults. In fact, memory performance is typically positively correlated
with IQ (Ackerman et al., 2005), but in our sample of older adults IQ was not
significantly correlated with recall (rho = .11, p = .53). In addition, memory ability is
highly relevant to learning in this task. Remembering previous outcomes is essential to
building and maintaining a mental representation of the task environment and statistics
(e.g., the current helicopter location, one’s confidence in that estimate, the noise in the
bag drop distribution), which is necessary for adaptive modulation of learning rates
according to normative factors. Updating with a fixed learning rate does not require such
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memory demands. Therefore, it is highly plausible that memory capacity constrains one’s
ability to perform adaptive inference. It is also possible, however, that this is only true in
older individuals, where memory abilities start to decline.
We cannot distinguish between these different possibilities, however, since did
not collect memory measures in the young adults in Experiment 1. Therefore, we
conducted a third experiment, with young adults, in an attempt to replicate and
disentangle the different cognitive influences on adaptive learning.

Experiment 3: Method
While our first two experiments both point to cognitive factors as explaining
individual differences in adaptive learning, the specific associations we observed in the
two samples were with different cognitive measures—IQ in younger adults and memory
(but not IQ) in older adults. In Experiment 3, we aimed to distinguish potential
explanations for this discrepancy by measuring both IQ and memory in the same sample
of young adults who performed our adaptive learning task.
Participants. For Experiment 3 we recruited 40 participants from the University of
Pennsylvania community (age 18–31, M = 23.2, SD = 3.4; 38% males). Inclusion and
exclusion criteria were the same as in Experiment 1. Data from one participant were
excluded from analysis because the participant fell asleep. The effective sample for
analysis was therefore N = 39.
Procedure. Participants completed a memory task (described below), the
similarities and matrix reasoning subtests of the WASI (Wechsler, 1999), and the
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helicopter task, in that order. Experimenter MP obtained informed consent from the
participants, and administered the IQ test and the helicopter task. Experimenter YX
administered the memory task. We used the shorter version of the helicopter task (100
trials per experimental block), but the training was identical to that used in Experiments 1
and 2.
Memory Task. Participants performed a free recall task in a single session
consisting of eleven word lists in total. The first list was for practice and the ten
subsequent lists were scored. The procedures were modeled based on previous
experimental studies of free recall (Polyn, Erlikhman, & Kahana, 2011; Zaromb, et al.,
2006). Each list consisted of 16 words and each word was presented one at a time on a
computer screen using E-Prime software (Version 2.0, Psychology Software Tools,
Pittsburgh, PA). All text was presented in white with a black background. At the end of
each list, participants were asked to name, in any order, as many words as they could
recall from the just-presented list. The words and their order within lists were identical
for all participants. All words were drawn randomly without replacement from the
Toronto Noun Pool (retrieved from
http://memory.psych.upenn.edu/files/wordpools/nouns.txt). The word pool consists of
480 words with estimates of word frequency and concreteness. We divided the pool into
16 groups (obtained by crossing quartiles of frequency and concreteness), and
constructed each list by drawing a word from each of the 16 groups. At the beginning of
each list, there was a 1500-ms delay before the first word was shown on the screen. Each
word then appeared on screen for 3000-ms followed by a jittered interstimulus interval
(uniformly drawn between 800 and 1200-ms). After the last item in each list, there was a
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jittered delay period (uniform on 1200-1400-ms) before a 1000-ms tone sounded. The
tone signaled to the participant the beginning of the recall period. From the tone,
participants had 75 seconds to attempt to recall any words from the list that was just
shown. Participants were signaled by a 2000-ms tone at the end of the 75-second period
to stop recalling. The experimenter recorded participants’ recalled words in order, on a
pre-prepared answer sheet.
Statistical Analysis. Data were analyzed as in Experiments 1 and 2. In addition,
we used the Aroian version of the Sobel’s test (Aroian, 1947; Sobel, 1982) to evaluate the
mediating effect of normative learning on the relationship between age group and task
performance.

Experiment 3: Results and Discussion
In this third experiment, we administered the predictive-inference task to a second sample
of younger adults, and collected measures of both IQ and free recall to investigate the
differential effects of these two cognitive variables on adaptive learning.
Similar to Experiments 1 and 2, participants used higher learning rates with
higher spatial prediction error and lower noise (Figure 4A; median p across prediction
error bins < .0001) and higher learning rates right after a change point (Figure 4B). Also
like the previous experiments, model-based analysis revealed a significant positive
influence of both normative factors, CPP (Mdn = 0.41, Q1 = 0.24, Q3 = 0.57; Z = -5.44, p
< .0001) and RU (Mdn = 0.31, Q1 = 0.13, Q3 = 0.51; Z = -5.44, p < .0001), and nonnormative factors, PE (Mdn = 0.56, Q1 = 0.42 , Q3 = 0.71; Z = -5.36, p < .0001) and
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reward (Mdn = 0.05, Q1 = 0.03, Q3 = 0.09; Z = -4.48, p < .0001), on trial-by-trial
updating (Figure 4C).
The results of Experiment 3 replicated the pattern observed in Experiment 2, in
which memory (free recall), but not IQ, predicted normative-based belief updating. A
model with IQ as the sole independent variable did not significantly predict NLF (Table
3, F(1,37)= 0.13, p = .72), while a model with only free recall did significantly predict
NLF (F(1,37) = 5.32, p = .027). A formal comparison showed that adding IQ in addition
to free recall did not improve prediction of NLF (F(1,36) = 0.42, p = .52). There was a
small but insignificant direct association between free recall and helicopter task
performance (rho = .19, p = .25).
In looking at the effects of memory performance on CPP- and RU-based updating
separately, we found that both were positively correlated with percent recall (rho = .41, p
= .01, Figure 4D; and rho = .27, p = .09, Figure 4E, respectively). (Note that while we
report two-tailed hypothesis tests to be consistent throughout the manuscript, the RU
effect would reach significance in a one-tailed test, which would be merited given our
stated attempt to replicate Experiment 2.) Finally, reward-based updating was not
significantly associated with either IQ (F(1,37) = 0.14, p = .71) or percent recall (F(1,37)
= 2.32, p = .14; Figure 4F).
In this second experiment with young participants, we replicated the memory
effect seen in older participants— free recall performance predicted the degree to which
participants update beliefs based on normative learning factors. Because we used
previously collected data from the older sample in Experiment 2, the exact memory
measures in the two experiments differed, though both are measures of immediate free
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recall. When we z-scored the immediate memory measures within each sample and
examined the association across the combined sample (total N = 77), memory
performance was robustly associated with both CPP- and RU-based belief updating (rho
= .42, p = .0001 and rho = .35, p = .0019, respectively).
However, we did not replicate the significant association between IQ and belief
updating based on normative factors that we observed in the first sample of young adults
in Experiment 1. If we combine data across the two young samples (total N = 88), the
association between IQ and CPP-based updating remains statistically significant (rho =
.22, p = 0.04), while that between IQ and RU-based updating does not (rho = .17, p =
.11). Furthermore, if we combine across all three samples of (total N =126), IQ is no
longer significantly associated with either CPP- (rho = .15, p = .09) or RU-based belief
updating (rho = -.058, p = .52). However, we hesitate to conclude that the correlation
between IQ and adaptive learning (particularly CPP-based learning) is zero. To have 80%
power to detect a true correlation of rho = .15, we would need a sample size of 346, and
to detect a true correlation of rho = .20, we would need a sample size of 194, both of
which are larger than the samples we collected in any individual experiment or our
combined sample across all three experiments (calculated with “pwr” R package).

Group differences between young and elderly participants
We hypothesized that age would also be a source of individual differences in adaptive
learning. To test this, we pooled data from the two samples of younger participants from
Experiments 1 and 3, as their performance was comparable, and we had no a priori
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reason to expect differences between the two samples. We then compared this combined
young sample (N = 88) to the sample of older participants from Experiment 2 (N = 38,
Figure 5). We looked at the two normative learning factors (CPP and RU effects)
separately because prior research has shown differential effects of age on these two
factors (Nassar et al., 2016). Overall, the younger group performed slightly better at the
task, gathering more coins (M = 29% of total, SD = 2.3) than the older group (M = 27.6%,
SD = 2.6, t(124) = 3.04, p = .003). There was no significant difference between the
groups in CPP-based updating (t(124) = 1.07, p = .29). However, younger participants
were more influenced by the other model-based factor, RU (M = 0.26, SD = .25), than
older participants (M = 0.14, SD = .27, t(124) = 2.52, p = .013). Younger participants
were also more influenced by the non-normative reward factor (M = 0.07, SD = .09) than
older participants (M = 0.03, SD = .07, t(124) = 2.42, p = .017).
Given that both task performance and normative learning differ between young
and elderly participants, we asked whether differences in learning behavior account for
differences in coins collected between age groups. Age group was a significant predictor
of the RU effect (b = -0.126, t(124) = -2.52, p = .013), and the RU effect significantly
predicted coins collected, while controlling for age group (b = 0.032, t(123) = 4.05, p <
.0001). The effect of age group in predicting coins collected, while significant, decreased
once the mediating variable (RU effect) was controlled for (b = -0.010, t(123) = -2.25, p
= .026), compared to a model without the RU effect (b = -0.014, t(124) = -3.04, p = .003).
The indirect (mediating) effect was significant (Sobel’s Z = -2.09, p = .036), suggesting
that RU-based updating partially mediates the relationship between age group and task
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performance. However, reward-based updating, which also differed between age groups,
was not a significant mediator of that relationship (Sobel’s Z = 1.43, p = .15).
In this predictive-inference task, the updating behavior of older adults was less
influenced by uncertainty. This replicates previous findings with a different version of the
helicopter task (Nassar et al., 2016). Nassar and colleagues used computational modeling
to show that older adults are specifically impaired in representing and using uncertainty
to drive learning. As the task used by Nassar and colleagues (2016) included dramatic
manipulations of uncertainty (the helicopter’s location was occasionally directly
revealed), our results show that this deficit in uncertainty-based learning extends to
situations with more subtle fluctuations in uncertainty. Nassar and colleagues (2016)
further showed that differences between age groups cannot be accounted for by
differences in fluid intelligence or working memory. Our data are consistent with this
interpretation, inasmuch as IQ scores were higher in the older adults. Furthermore, in a
regression model predicting the RU effect (F(3,122) = 3.76, p = .013), age group is close
to significance (b = 1.08, t(122) = 1.95, p = .054), after controlling for IQ (b = 0.005,
t(122) = 1.45, p = .15) and its interaction with age group (b = -0.01, t(122) = -2.18, p =
.031). Unfortunately, we cannot perform a similar test looking at the interaction between
age and memory because we have different memory measures for the two age groups.
Nassar et al. (2016) also reported that older adults are more sensitive to CPP than young
adults, but we did not find such an effect.
Older participants were also less influenced than young participants by noninformative rewards. This finding is consistent with previous evidence that healthy aging
is associated with decreased sensitivity to reward in a probabilistic learning task, which is
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neurobiologically mediated by reduced white matter integrity in select prefrontal
pathways (Samanez-Larkin, Levens, Perry, Dougherty, & Knutson, 2012). Interestingly,
older adults’ diminished sensitivity to reward is present both in contexts where reward is
informative and advantageous (Samanez-Larkin et al., 2012) and where reward is noninformative and reward sensitivity might weaken performance.

General Discussion
Across three experiments, we investigated how personality, cognitive abilities and age
affect individual differences in adaptive learning in volatile environments. We used a
modified version of a predictive-inference task that allows tracking of trial-by-trial
learning rates (McGuire et al., 2012; Nassar et al., 2010, 2012, 2016). Consistent with
several previous reports using this task (McGuire et al., 2014; Nassar et al., 2010, 2012),
we found that learning rates were influenced by two normative factors related to surprise
(CPP) and uncertainty (RU), as well as by incidental rewards. As a unique contribution of
this paper, we found that the degree of reliance on normative learning factors is positively
associated with cognitive abilities — specifically memory abilities measured with free
recall — but not with personality. In addition, we found that advanced age was associated
with a reduced influence of the normative RU factor and a reduced influence of the nonnormative reward factor. Thus, age and cognitive abilities had distinct patterns of overall
influence on adaptive learning.
Our finding that better memory abilities are associated with the influence of
normative learning factors is broadly consistent with a body or work showing that
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reliance on “model-based” rather than “model-free” reinforcement learning is dependent
on cognitive resources (Otto, Raio, Chiang, Phelps, & Daw, 2013, Otto et al., 2014). In
this framework, model-based learning relies on building a sophisticated mental model of
the environment and evaluating choices in the context of that model, in the same way that
adaptive inference in the helicopter task requires building an internal model of the
structure of the environment (incorporating components such as wind, clouds and a
moving helicopter) and flexibly updating one’s learning rate depending on the
circumstances. In contrast, model-free learning relies on the simpler approach of caching
the value of different actions (Daw, Niv, & Dayan, 2005). Recent work using this
reinforcement learning framework has shown that individual differences in cognitive
abilities, specifically better working memory and cognitive control, predict increased
model-based vs. model-free contributions to learning (Otto et al., 2013, 2014). In
addition, high working memory capacity protects individuals against the deleterious
effect of stress on model-based learning (Otto et al., 2013).
With our results, two independent studies have now shown that learning in older
participants is less driven by uncertainty than in young participants. Our previous fMRI
study has shown that activity in anterior prefrontal regions increases with RU, while
activity in the medial temporal lobe decreases with RU (McGuire et al., 2014). Both of
these brain regions show structural and functional impairment in healthy aging (Buckner,
2004; Fjell et al., 2014; Raz et al., 2005;), which might contribute to a diminished ability
to compute or use an RU signal. Future work could investigate whether reduced
uncertainty-driven learning in older adults is associated with changes in prefrontal or
hippocampal activity, or both.
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Prior research has hinted at a potential role for affect and arousal in adaptive
learning. Pupil diameter, which is a measure of arousal, tracks normative factors that
should influence learning rates, and the extent to which pupil diameter tracks these
factors across participants predicts learning rates (Nassar et al., 2012). BOLD activity in
dorsomedial frontal cortex and anterior insula, two regions linked with arousal (Seeley et
al., 2007), is modulated by factors that influence learning rate, and the extent to which
activity in these regions is modulated by normative factors predicts the degree of
behavioral sensitivity to these same factors (McGuire et al., 2014). However, we did not
find that adaptive learning was associated with any measures of personality, including
some that should capture differences in affective arousal. This result differs from another
recent report, which found that anxiety was associated with a reduced effect of volatility
on learning rates (Browning et al., 2015). As discussed above, this study may have found
an association as the stimuli being predicted were aversive (and potentially anxietyinducing) electric shocks. This difference in findings suggests that the influence of
personality on adaptive learning may be context-sensitive. More broadly, our results
suggest that adaptive learning is a result of the interplay between both cognitive and
affective factors, with cognitive abilities playing a crucial role in constructing mental
models and expectations, the deviations from which drive arousal and other affective
responses. Future work is needed to more completely characterize this complex interplay.
Overall, our findings further extend the aspects of learning and decision-making
that are affected by age and cognitive abilities. In addition to known and specific benefits
of better memory, our results highlight how this core psychological process enables
people to behave more adaptively in a changing world.
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Tables

Table 1. Summary of regression results for three models predicting NLF in Experiment
1. Model 1 includes just one cognitive measure, IQ. Model 2 includes only personality
measures. Model 3 includes both cognitive and all personality measures of interest.

Model 1
Variable

Model 2

Model 3

B

SE B

t(47)

B

SE B

t(41)

B

SE B

t(40)

I

-0.675

0.347

-1.804

0.515

0.520

0.991

-0.526

0.684

-0.768

IQ

0.008

0.003

2.611*

0.008

0.003

2.208a

A

0.026

0.061

0.435

0.025

0.058

0.436

E

-0.070

0.043

-1.633

-0.066

0.041

-1.609

C

-0.032

0.054

-0.586

-0.020

0.052

-0.383

N

0.060

0.053

1.130

0.055

0.051

1.089

O

-0.013

0.056

-0.240

-0.012

0.054

-0.221

STAI

-0.007

0.005

-1.526

-0.005

0.005

-1.032

SS

0.065

0.059

1.097

0.066

0.057

1.171

Model F

F(1,47)= 6.82*

F(7,41) = 0.78

F(8,40) = 1.36

I = Intercept; A = Agreeableness; E = Extraversion; C = Conscientiousness; N =
Neuroticism; O = Openness; SS = Sensation Seeking; B = unstandardized regression
coefficient; SE B = standard error of B; t(dfs) = t-test statistic and degrees of freedom
*p < 0.013
a

p = 0.033
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Table 2. Summary of regression results for three models predicting NLF in Experiment
2. Model 1 includes only cognitive measures. Model 2 includes only personality
measures. Model 3 includes all cognitive and personality measures of interest.

Model 1
Variable

Model 2

Model 3

B

SE B

t(28)

B

SE B

t(31)

B

SE B

t(22)

I

-1.747

1.168

-1.496

0.367

0.402

0.912

-2.433

1.272

-1.913

IQ

-0.002

0.003

-0. 767

-0.000002

0.004

-0.001

MMSE

0.008

0.032

0.256

-0.008

0.039

-0.201

DSpanF

0.053

0.021

2.537*

0.082

0.027

3.000b

DSpanB

-0.004

0.017

-0.213

-0.024

0.022

-1.084

Trails A

-0.004

0.005

-0.724

-0.003

0.006

-0.469

Trails B

0.003

0.001

2.050a

0.004

0.002

2.167c

Boston N

0.034

0.023

1.445

0.045

0.026

1.704

T Recall

0.020

0.010

2.053a

0.026

0.011

2.415d

D Recall

0.005

0.027

0.191

-0.014

0.034

-0.402

A

0.014

0.079

0.180

0.006

0.076

0.080

E

-0.067

0.053

-1.254

0.005

0.048

0.110

C

-0.030

0.067

-0.455

-0.068

0.062

-1.106

N

-0.045

0.051

-0.935

-0.013

0.044

-0.298

O

0.052

0.062

0.829

0.120

0.054

2.214c

SS

0.035

0.061

0.582

0.075

0.058

1.306

Model F

F(9,28)= 3.17*

F(6,31) = 0.47

F(15,22) = 2.50d

I = Intercept; MMSE = Mini Mental State Examination score; DSpanF = Digit Span
Forward score; DSpanB = Digit Span Backwar score; Boston N = Boston Naming score;
T Recall = Word List Memory Total Recall score; D Recall = Word List Memory
Delayed Recall score; A = Agreeableness; E = Extraversion; C = Conscientiousness; N =
Neuroticism; O = Openness; SS = Sensation Seeking; B = unstandardized regression
coefficient; SE B = standard error of B; t(dfs) = t-test statistic and degrees of freedom; *p
< 0.017; a p < 0.0498; b p < 0.007; c p < 0.042; d p < 0.025
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Table 3. Summary of regression results for models predicting NLF in Experiment 3.
Model 1 only includes Percent Recall. Model 2 only includes IQ. Model 3 includes both
Percent Recall and IQ.

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Variable

B

SE B

t(37)

B

SE B

t(37)

B

SE B

t(36)

Intercept

-0.017

0.173

-0.096

0.600

0.626

0.957

0.354

0.601

0.589

RP

0.633

0.274

2.307*

0.653

0.278

2.346*

-0.003

0.005

-0.645

IQ
Model F

-0.002
F(1,37) = 5.32*

0.005

-0.361

F(1,37)= 0.13

F(2,36) = 2.83

PR = percent recall; B = unstandardized regression coefficient; SE B = standard error of
B; t(dfs) = t-test statistic and degrees of freedom
*p < 0.027
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Figures

Figure 1. Overview of helicopter task and normative learning factors. A. Screenshots of
helicopter task taken from training and experimental blocks. Participants were asked to position a
bucket (orange rectangle) right under the helicopter to collect coins. On every trial, the helicopter
drops bags which explode into coins upon reaching the ground. Once participants position the
bucket and commit the selection, the bucket turns blue and can no longer be moved until the next
trial. Bucket shows the gradual accumulation of coins over the course of a block. On every trial,
participants receive visual feedback about the distance between the bag drop location and the last
selected bucket position (prediction error, in red). All blocks in the main experiment included
clouds, which obscured the helicopter from view. B. Fluctuation of normative learning factors in
a sample experimental block. Change points (black dots) typically result in large prediction
errors, and change-point probability (in red) is highest on such trials, while relative uncertainly
(in blue) increases right after a change point and gradually decreases thereafter, as learner
acquires additional evidence about the new helicopter position.
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Figure 2. Experiment 1 results: normative learning behavior and its associations with IQ. A.
Relationship between error magnitude and learning rates, shown separately for low (blue) versus
high noise/wind (orange) blocks. Learning rates scaled with the magnitude of prediction errors,
and were higher in the low wind blocks. Average learning rates (circles) were calculated in bins
of error magnitude in intervals of 10 units centered around the midpoint of each bin, combining
data from all participants. In both A and B: error bars indicate standard error of the mean;
significant group differences between low and high noise blocks are indicated by * (p<0.05) or **
(p<0.0001). B. Relationship between number of trials after a change point and learning rates,
shown separately by type of block. Learning rates were highest on trials right after a change point
and decreased steeply thereafter. Each circle represents average learning rate grouped by number
of trials after a change point, combining data from all participants. C. Individual differences in
effects of normative and non-normative factors on updating behavior. Each effect is calculated as
regression coefficients for respective factor in predicting bucket updates. Each circle represents
the respective coefficient for one participant; black square represents median coefficient for each
factor. Circles are jittered for better visibility. Reward effect is the effect of updating based on
rewarded versus non-rewarded coins. D. Scatterplot of relationship between IQ and CPP effect
(as represented in C), including best-fit line. Higher IQ was associated with higher CPP-based
updating. E. Scatterplot of relationship between IQ and RU effect (as represented in C), including
best-fit line. Higher IQ was associated with higher RU-based updating. F. Scatterplot of
relationship between IQ and Reward effect (as represented in C), including best-fit line. All
correlations are Spearman’s rho.
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Figure 3. Experiment 2 results: normative learning behavior and its associations with
memory. A. Relationship between error magnitude and learning rates, shown separately for low
versus high noise/wind blocks. Learning rates scaled with the magnitude of prediction errors, and
were higher in the low wind blocks. Average learning rates (circles) were calculated in bins of
error magnitude in intervals of 10 units centered around the midpoint of each bin, combining data
from all participants. In both A and B: error bars indicate standard error of the mean; significant
group differences between low and high noise blocks are indicated by * (p<0.05) or **
(p<0.0001). B. Relationship between number of trials after a change point and learning rates,
shown separately by type of block. Learning rates were highest on trials right after a change point
and decreased steeply thereafter. Each circle represents average learning rate grouped by number
of trials after a change point, combining data from all participants. C. Individual differences in
effects of normative and non-normative factors on updating behavior. Each effect is calculated as
regression coefficients for respective factor in predicting bucket updates. Each circle represents
the respective coefficient for one participant; black square represents median coefficient for each
factor. Circles are jittered for better visibility. Reward effect is the effect of updating based on
rewarded versus non-rewarded coins. D, E, and F. Scatterplots of relationship between memory
and CPP- , RU-, and Reward effects, respectively, including best-fit lines. All correlations are
Spearman’s rho.
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Figure 4. Experiment 3 results: normative learning behavior and its associations with
memory. A. Relationship between error magnitude and learning rates, shown separately for low
(blue) versus high noise/wind (orange) blocks. Learning rates scaled with the magnitude of
prediction errors, and were higher in the low wind blocks. Average learning rates (circles) were
calculated in bins of error magnitude in intervals of 10 units centered around the midpoint of each
bin, combining data from all participants. In both A and B: error bars indicate standard error of
the mean; significant group differences between low and high noise blocks are indicated by *
(p<0.05) or ** (p<0.0001). B. Relationship between number of trials after a change point and
learning rates, shown separately by type of block. Learning rates were highest on trials right after
a change point and decreased steeply thereafter. Each circle represents average learning rate
grouped by number of trials after a change point, combining data from all participants. C.
Individual differences in effects of normative and non-normative factors on updating behavior.
Each effect is calculated as regression coefficients for respective factor in predicting bucket
updates. Each circle represents the respective coefficient for one participant; black square
represents median coefficient for each factor. Circles are jittered for better visibility. Reward
effect is the effect of updating based on rewarded versus non-rewarded coins. D, E, and F.
Scatterplots of relationship between memory and CPP- , RU-, and Reward effects, respectively,
including best-fit lines. All correlations are Spearman’s rho.
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young
elderly

Average coefficient

0.4

0.3

*

0.2

*

0.1

0

CPP effect
RU effect
Reward effect
Figure 5. Group differences between young and older participants in updating based on
normative factors and the incidental reward factor. Older participants update less based on
RU and coin value. Barplots show average effects for young (dark gray) and old (light gray) and
error bars show standard error of the mean. Asterisk represents a significant group difference with
p < 0.02.
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CHAPTER 3 — Diminished cortical thickness is associated with
impulsive choice in adolescence

Marieta Pehlivanova, Daniel H. Wolf, Aristeidis Sotiras, Antonia Kaczkurkin, Tyler M.
Moore, Rastko Ciric, Philip A. Cook, Angel Garcia de La Garza, Adon Rosen, Kosha
Ruparel, Anup Sharma, Russell T. Shinohara, David R. Roalf, Ruben C. Gur, Christos
Davatzikos, Raquel E. Gur, Joseph W. Kable, & Theodore D. Satterthwaite

Abstract
Adolescence is characterized by both maturation of brain structure and increased risk of
negative outcomes from behaviors associated with impulsive decision-making, such as
substance abuse and automobile accidents. One important index of impulsive choice is
delay discounting (DD), which measures the tendency to prefer smaller rewards available
soon to larger rewards delivered after a delay. However, it remains largely unknown how
individual differences in structural brain development may be associated with impulsive
choice during adolescence. Leveraging a unique large sample of 427 youths (208 males
and 219 females) studied as part of the Philadelphia Neurodevelopmental Cohort, we
examined associations between delay discounting and cortical thickness within structural
covariance networks. These structural networks were derived using non-negative matrix
factorization, an advanced multivariate analysis technique for dimensionality reduction,
and analyzed using generalized additive models with penalized splines to capture both
linear and nonlinear developmental effects. We found that impulsive choice was most
strongly associated with diminished cortical thickness in structural brain networks that
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encompassed the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, temporal pole, and
temporal-parietal junction. Furthermore, structural brain networks predicted DD above
and beyond cognitive performance. Taken together, these results suggest that reduced
cortical thickness in regions known to be involved in value-based decision-making is a
marker of impulsive choice during the critical period of adolescence.

Significance
Risky behaviors during adolescence, such as initiation of drug use or reckless driving, are
a major source of morbidity and mortality. In this study, we present evidence from a large
sample of youth that diminished cortical thickness in specific structural brain networks is
associated with impulsive choice. Notably, the strongest association between impulsive
choice and brain structure was seen in regions implicated in value-based decisionmaking, namely the ventromedial prefrontal and orbitofrontal cortex. Moving forward,
such neuroanatomical markers of impulsivity may aid in the development of personalized
interventions targeted to reduce risk of negative outcomes during the critical period of
adolescence.

Introduction
Adolescence is marked by an increased vulnerability to risky behaviors, such as
tobacco, alcohol, and drug use, reckless driving, and unprotected sex, which can lead to
increased morbidity and mortality (Eaton et al., 2011). During this vulnerable period, the
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brain undergoes dramatic structural changes (Giedd et al., 1999; Sowell et al., 2004).
Some evidence suggests that risk during adolescence is associated with differential
maturation of brain regions related to reward processing (such as the orbitofrontal cortex
and ventral striatum) and those necessary for cognitive control (such as the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex, dlPFC; Casey, Jones, & Hare, 2008; Van Leijenhorst et al., 2010). One
of the most commonly used indices of impulsive choice is delay discounting (DD)— a
behavioral measure of impulsivity where one chooses between a smaller reward delivered
sooner, and a larger reward with a longer delay (Kable, 2013; Kirby & Maraković, 1995;
Peters & Büchel, 2011). Delay discounting engages regions known to mature at different
rates in adolescence, including dlPFC (Peters & Büchel, 2011), orbitofrontal cortex and
ventral striatum (Bartra, McGuire, & Kable, 2013; Kable & Glimcher, 2007). Increased
DD has been proposed as a framework for understanding substance abuse and other risky
decisions as reflecting impulsive choices of immediate reward (Bickel et al., 2007).
Indeed, studies of adolescents show that higher impulsivity, as indexed by higher
discounting, is associated with increased smoking frequency (Reynolds, 2004), greater
alcohol consumption (Field, Christiansen, Cole, & Goudie, 2007), and predicts
longitudinal increase in both smoking (Audrain-McGovern et al., 2009) and alcohol use
(Fernie et al., 2013).
At present, it remains relatively unknown how individual differences in structural
brain development may relate to DD in adolescents. Neuroanatomical studies in adults
are more numerous, but have yielded inconsistent results, perhaps due to small samples
and focused region-of-interest analyses (for a review see Kable & Levy, 2015). For
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example, it has been reported that greater DD (more impulsive choice) is associated with
reduced gray matter volume in lateral prefrontal cortex (Bjork, Momenan, & Hommer,
2009), superior frontal gyrus (Schwartz et al., 2010), and putamen (Cho et al., 2013;
Dombrovski et al., 2012). Furthermore, greater DD has been associated with larger
volume of the ventral striatum and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC, Schwartz et al.,
2010), medial prefrontal regions and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC, Cho et al., 2013),
and prefrontal cortex (Wang et al., 2016). One study of cortical thickness (CT) in adults
revealed an association between higher DD and decreased CT in both medial prefrontal
cortex and the ACC (Bernhardt et al., 2014). To our knowledge, there have been no
neuroanatomical studies in adolescents to specifically examine the relationship between
DD and cortical thickness. Notably, findings from adults may not necessarily extend to
adolescents, given the dynamic re-modeling of brain structure that occurs during this
critical period (Sowell et al., 2004).
Accordingly, here we investigated how individual differences in DD may be
associated with differences in brain structure during adolescence. To do this, we
capitalized upon a large sample of 427 youths imaged as part of the Philadelphia
Neurodevelopmental Cohort (Satterthwaite et al., 2014a; 2016). We delineated
covariance networks of cortical thickness using a recently-developed application of nonnegative matrix factorization for the multivariate analysis of high-dimensional
neuroimaging data (Sotiras, Resnick, & Davatzikos, 2015). Subsequently, we evaluated
the association between DD and CT in each network while specifically modeling both
linear and nonlinear developmental effects using penalized splines. We hypothesized that
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we would find associations between DD and CT in brain regions encoding reward value
such as the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC; Bartra et al., 2013; Kable &
Glimcher, 2007), as well as regions subserving cognitive control (e.g., dlPFC). As
described below, diminished CT in these as well as other networks was associated with
impulsive choice, and predicted individual variation in DD above and beyond that
explained by cognitive performance.

Methods
Participants and sample construction
Participants were a subsample of 1,601 youths recruited as part of the
Philadelphia Neurodevelopmental Cohort (PNC) who underwent neurocognitive
assessment (Gur et al., 2010; 2012) as well as multimodal neuroimaging (Satterthwaite et
al., 2014a; 2016). A sub-sample of PNC participants (n = 453) completed the delay
discounting (DD) task. Of those, n = 2 did not pass the quality control criteria for the task
(described below). Additionally, n = 24 participants were excluded for the following
reasons: health conditions that could impact brain structure (n = 19), scanning performed
more than 12 months from DD testing (n = 1), or inadequate structural image quality (n =
4). The remaining n = 427 participants constituted our final sample for analysis (mean
age at scanning: 17.0 ± 3.2 years, age range: 9.3–24.3 years; 48.7%, n = 208 males).
Delay discounting task
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The DD task consisted of 34 self-paced questions where the participant chose
between a smaller amount of money available immediately or a larger amount available
after a delay. This task was modeled after the work of Senecal et al. (2012). The smaller,
immediate rewards ranged between $10 and $34 and were always displayed at the top of
the computer screen. The larger, delayed rewards were fixed at $25, $30, or $35, with the
delays ranging between 1 and 171 days. Larger, delayed rewards were always displayed
on the bottom of the screen. All rewards were hypothetical but participants were
instructed to make decisions as if the choices were real. Discount rates based on
hypothetical choices have shown no systematic differences from discount rates based on
real rewards, in the same subjects (Johnson & Bickel, 2002). The set of choices was
identical in content and order for all participants. The DD task was administered as part
of an hour-long web-based battery of neurocognitive tests (Computerized Neurocognitive
Battery, described below), on a separate day from the imaging session. The mean interval
between the DD task and imaging was 0.44 months with a SD of 1 month (range 0–8
months).
Discount rates from the delay discounting task were calculated assuming a
hyperbolic discounting model of the form: SV = A/(1+kD), where SV is the subjective
value of the delayed reward, A is amount of the delayed reward, D is the delay in days,
and k is the subject-specific discount rate (Mazur, 1987). We used the fmincon
optimization algorithm in MATLAB (Mathworks, Natick, MA) to estimate the bestfitting k from each participant’s choice data. A higher k value indicates steeper
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discounting of delayed rewards and thus more impulsive choices. As the distribution of
discount rates is highly right-skewed, we used log-transformed k (log k) in all analyses.
We performed quality control to ensure that participants were not responding
randomly, and verified that their responses were a function of task variables which should
be relevant to the choice. Although a hyperbolic discounting model has been shown to fit
discounting data better than an exponential model (Kirby & Maraković, 1995), quality
control was performed independently of assumptions about the shape of the discount
function. Specifically, each participant’s responses were fit with a logistic regression
model, with predictors including the immediate amount, delayed amount, delay, their
respective squared terms, and two-way interaction terms. We assessed goodness of fit of
this model using the coefficient of discrimination (Tjur, 2009), and discarded DD data
from any participant who had a value of less than 0.20.
Neurocognitive battery
Cognition was assessed using the University of Pennsylvania Computerized
Neurocognitive Battery (Penn CNB, Gur et al., 2010; 2012) during the same session that
delay discounting was evaluated. Briefly, this hour-long battery consisted of 14 tests
administered in a fixed order, evaluating various aspects of cognition, including
executive control, episodic memory, complex reasoning, social cognition, and
sensorimotor and motor speed. Except for the motor tests that only measure speed, each
test provides measures of both accuracy and speed. Performance on the tests for each
domain is summarized as cognitive factors obtained with exploratory factor analysis with
an oblique rotation (Moore, Reise, Gur, Hakonarson, & Gur, 2015). Prior work has
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demonstrated that accuracy on this battery can be parsimoniously summarized as either
one overall cognitive performance factor or three domain-specific factors, including
executive function and complex reasoning combined, social cognition, and episodic
memory (Moore et al., 2015). Associations between DD and factor scores for each of
these dimensions were analyzed, as described below.
Image acquisition and quality assurance
Image acquisition and processing are reported in detail elsewhere (Satterthwaite et
al., 2014a; 2016). Briefly, all data were acquired on a single scanner (Siemens TIM Trio
3 Tesla, Erlangen, Germany; 32-channel head coil) using the same imaging sequences.
Structural brain scanning was completed using a magnetization‐prepared, rapid
acquisition gradient‐echo (MPRAGE) T1‐weighted image with the following
parameters: TR 1810 ms; TE 3.51 ms; FOV 180x240 mm; matrix 192x256; 160 slices;
slice thickness/gap 1/0 mm; TI 1100 ms; flip angle 9 degrees; effective voxel resolution
of 0.93 x 0.93 x 1.00 mm; total acquisition time 3:28 min. T1 image quality was
independently assessed by three expert image analysts, who were trained to >85%
concordance with faculty consensus rating on an independent dataset; images with
substantial artifact were excluded from analysis.
Image processing and cortical thickness estimation
Structural image processing for estimating cortical thickness (CT) used tools
included in Advanced Normalization Tools (ANTs, Tustison et al., 2014). In order to
avoid registration bias and maximize sensitivity to detect regional effects that can be
impacted by registration error, a custom adolescent template and tissue priors were
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created. Structural images were then processed and registered to this template using the
ANTs CT pipeline (Tustison et al., 2014). This procedure includes brain extraction, N4
bias field correction (Tustison et al., 2010), Atropos probabilistic tissue segmentation
(Avants et al., 2011b), the top-performing SyN diffeomorphic registration method (Klein
et al., 2010; Avants et al., 2011a), and direct estimation of cortical thickness in
volumetric space (Das, Avants, Grossman, & Gee, 2009). Large-scale evaluation studies
have shown that this highly accurate procedure for estimating CT is more sensitive to
individual differences over the lifespan than comparable techniques (Tustison et al.,
2014). CT images were down-sampled to 2 mm voxels before applying non-negative
matrix factorization, but no additional smoothing was performed.
Non-negative matrix factorization
Cortical thickness was estimated as described above over the entire cortical
surface. We sought to reduce CT in our sample into fewer dimensions, for two reasons.
First, an efficient summary of CT data would allow us to evaluate only a small number of
associations, rather than conduct voxel-wise inference that may be vulnerable to
substantial Type I error (Eklund, Nichols, & Knutsson, 2016). Second, and importantly,
prior work has shown that there are inherent patterns of covariance in CT (AlexanderBloch, Giedd, & Bullmore, 2013; Sotiras et al., 2015, 2017; Zielinski, Gennatas, Zhou, &
Seeley, 2010), and analyzing the data according to this covariance structure may enhance
interpretability.
Accordingly, we achieved both goals by using non-negative matrix factorization
(NMF) to identify structural networks where cortical thickness co-varies consistently
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across individuals and brain regions (Sotiras et al., 2015). NMF has previously been
shown to yield more interpretable and reproducible components than other decomposition
techniques such as Principal Component Analysis or Independent Component Analysis
(Sotiras et al., 2015, 2017). In contrast to the other techniques, NMF only yields compact
networks with positive weights, which facilitates interpretation of effects.
The NMF algorithm takes as input a matrix X containing voxel-wise CT estimates
(dimensions: 128,155 voxels x 427 participants), and approximates that matrix as a
product of two matrices with non-negative elements: X

BC (Figure 1). The first matrix,

B, is of size V x K and contains the estimated non-negative networks and their respective
loadings on each of the V voxels, where K is the user-specified number of networks. The
B matrix (“CT loadings”) is composed of coefficients that denote the relative contribution
of each voxel to a given network. These non-negative coefficients of the decomposition
by necessity represent the entirety of the brain as a subject-specific addition of various
parts. The second matrix, C, is of size K x N and contains subject-specific scores for each
network. These subject-specific scores (“CT network scores”) indicate the contribution of
each network in reconstructing the original CT map for each individual, and were
evaluated for associations with DD as described below. We examined multiple NMF
solutions requesting 2 to 30 networks (in steps of 2) and calculated reconstruction error
for each solution as the Frobenius norm between the CT data matrix and its NMF
approximation (Sotiras et al., 2015, 2017). The optimal number of components was
chosen based on the elbow of the gradient of the reconstruction error, such that the
solution is adequate to model the structure of the data without modeling random noise
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(Sotiras et al., 2017). Network loadings were visualized on the inflated PopulationAverage, Landmark-, and Surface-based (PALS) cortical surfaces (Van Essen, 2005)
using Caret software (Van Essen et al., 2001).
Experimental design and statistical analyses
To examine associations between DD and brain structure, we used a crosssectional sample of youths recruited as part of a large neurodevelopmental study. As
described above, our analysis sample consisted of 427 young participants who had usable
data from both the DD task and structural neuroimaging.
Brain development is frequently a nonlinear process (Giedd et al., 1999; Lenroot
et al., 2007; Satterthwaite et al., 2014b). In order to capture both linear and nonlinear age
effects, we modeled age with a penalized spline within Generalized Additive Models
(GAMs; Wood, 2004; 2011; Vandekar et al., 2015). In this type of model, a penalty is
assessed on nonlinearity using restricted maximum likelihood in order to avoid
overfitting. GAMs were implemented in the R package ‘mgcv’ (https://cran.rproject.org/web/packages/mgcv/index.html).
GAMs were first used to test for associations between DD and demographic
variables such as age and sex. Next, we evaluated the association between DD and
cognitive performance (as summarized by the overall cognitive performance factor and
three domain-specific factor scores described above), while co-varying for sex and age.
In both sets of analyses, DD was used as the dependent variable. Finally, univariate
associations between DD and NMF-derived structural covariance networks were
evaluated, with CT scores as the dependent variables and controlling for sex and age.
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Interactions between DD and age were evaluated but were not found to be significant,
and were thus not included in the univariate models. To control multiple testing across
either cognitive factors or structural covariance networks, we used the False Discovery
Rate (FDR, Q<0.05; Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995).
In order to ensure that our results were not driven by potentially confounding
factors, we conducted several sensitivity analyses. First, to ensure that our results were
not driven by socio-economic status (SES) or non-specific neurostructural effects, we
repeated these analyses while including maternal education and total brain volume as
model covariates in separate models. Second, we repeated our analyses while excluding
participants who were taking a psychotropic medication at the time of scan (n = 52) or for
whom medication data was not available (n = 3) to ensure that these participants did not
bias the observed results.
Multivariate analyses
The analyses described above examined univariate associations between each
structural covariance network and DD. As a final step, we also investigated the
multivariate predictive power of all cortical networks considered simultaneously, over
and above that of a reduced model that included only demographics and cognitive data.
The full model predicted DD using all 19 NMF networks, as well as age, sex, and the
cognitive factors that were significantly associated with DD. This full model was
compared to the reduced model (without the CT networks) using an F-test.
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Results
Impulsive choice is associated with reduced cognitive performance
Mean discount rate in our sample was 0.073 ± 0.088. Delay discounting was not
related to demographic variables including age (p = .387). There was a non-significant
trend toward more impulsive discounting in males (p = .07), and this trend was most
prominent at younger ages (age by sex interaction: p = .09). In contrast, delay discounting
was significantly associated with cognitive performance: youth who had higher discount
rates also tended to have lower overall cognitive performance (partial r = -.26, p < .0001).
Follow-up analyses with a three-factor model describing specific cognitive domains
revealed that this effect was driven primarily by an association with a combined
executive functioning and complex reasoning factor (partial r = -.29, p < .0001). Greater
discounting was also associated with diminished memory accuracy (partial r = -.20, p <
.0001), whereas there was no significant relationship between DD and social cognition
(partial r = -.08, p = .10).
Non-negative matrix factorization identifies structural covariance networks
Next, we sought to identify structural covariance networks in CT using NMF.
NMF provides a data-driven way to identify structural covariance networks, where
cortical thickness varies in a consistent way across individuals. As NMF identifies
structural networks at a resolution set by the user, we examined solutions ranging from 2
to 30 networks (in steps of 2). As expected, reconstruction error consistently decreased as
the number of networks increased. Similar to previous applications of this method
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(Sotiras et al., 2015), reconstruction error stabilized at 20 networks (Figure 2).
Accordingly, the 20-network solution was used for all subsequent analyses (Figure 3).
As in prior work using NMF (Sotiras et al., 2017), the structural covariance
networks identified were highly symmetric bilaterally. Networks included specific
cortical regions that are relevant to decision-making, such as ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (vmPFC) and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). Notably, when combined, several of the
networks corresponded to aspects of functional brain networks. For example, networks 1
and 3 loaded on ACC and anterior insula, respectively, similar to the “salience network”
(Seeley et al., 2007). Furthermore, specific networks defined lower-order systems,
including motor (network 11) and visual (network 12) cortex. The 20-network solution
also included a noise component (network 17), which was subsequently excluded from
all analyses, resulting in 19 networks evaluated in total.
Greater delay discounting is associated with diminished cortical thickness
Having identified 19 interpretable structural covariance networks using NMF, we
next examined associations with delay discounting while controlling for sex as well as
linear and nonlinear age effects using penalized splines. Univariate analyses revealed that
there was a significant association (after FDR correction) in eleven networks (Table 1). In
each of these networks, impulsive choice, indicated by high discount rates, was
associated with diminished cortical thickness. Notably, the strongest effects were found
in two networks including the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and orbitofrontal cortex,
both regions known to be critical for reward-related decision-making. These two
networks also included parts of the temporal pole and temporoparietal junction, TPJ
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(networks 14 and 15; Figure 4). Other networks where DD was associated with reduced
CT included the temporal poles (network 9), lateral (network 8) and posterior temporal
lobe (network 20), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (network 18), insula (network 3),
fusiform gyrus (network 7), fronto-parietal cortex (network 11), and visual cortex
(network 12).
Association between cortical thickness and delay discounting is independent of agerelated changes in cortical thickness
Having established that individual differences in DD are associated with CT, we
next examined whether this effect was moderated by age. Notably, there was no
significant age by DD interaction on any network (median p = .77, range: .09—.94).
Thus, age-related changes in CT were similar in both high and low discounters, but those
with a higher discount rate had thinner cortex across the age range examined (Figure 5).
Sensitivity analyses provide convergent results
We conducted sensitivity analysis to evaluate potentially confounding variables
including maternal education, total brain volume, and psychotropic medications. First, we
examined if results could be explained by differences in maternal education, a proxy of
socioeconomic status. Discount rate was significantly associated with maternal education
(partial r = -.164, p = .0007), but including it in the model did not have a great impact on
results. Specifically, 7 of 11 networks found to be related to DD remained FDRsignificant, including the vmPFC and OFC networks; the other 4 networks trended
towards significance (pfdr < .067). Second, we examined the effect of total brain volume
on our findings. After adding total brain volume as a covariate, 10 of 11 networks
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remained FDR-significant for association with DD, with the remaining network showing
a trend towards FDR-significance (pfdr = .0762). Finally, we repeated this analysis after
excluding 52 participants who were taking psychotropic medication at the time of scan
and 3 participants for whom medication data were missing. Despite the reduced power of
this smaller sample, 10 of 11 networks remained FDR-significant, with the final network
showing a trend trend towards significance (pfdr = .0503).
Covariance networks provide improved prediction of DD over demographic and
cognitive data
The univariate analyses described above demonstrated that reduced CT in several
structural covariance networks is associated with impulsive choice. Next, we tested
whether a multivariate model including all structural networks could accurately predict
DD on an individual basis. Delay discounting predicted from a model of CT scores in all
19 networks, as well demographic data (age and sex), was significantly correlated with
actual delay discounting behavior (r = .33, p < .0001; Figure 6). Adding CT scores to a
reduced model with demographics alone improved model fit (F(405,424) = 2.37, p = .001);
DD predicted from this reduced model with demographics only achieved a correlation of
.097 (p = .043) with actual log k values.
Importantly, CT data also improved prediction above and beyond that achieved by
cognitive predictors: adding CT scores to a model with cognitive performance as well as
demographics improved the model fit (F(403,422) = 1.63, p = .047). DD predicted from the
reduced model with just demographics and cognition achieved a correlation of .31 (p <
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.0001) between model-predicted and actual log k values, compared to a correlation of .40
(p < .0001) from the full model including CT data, cognitive data, and demographics.

Discussion
We examined associations between delay discounting and cortical thickness
networks in a large adolescent sample. More impulsive preferences, as indexed by higher
discounting, were associated with diminished CT in multiple networks. The strongest
effects were found in OFC, vmPFC, temporal pole, and the TPJ. Associations between
DD and brain structure did not vary over the age range studied, and could not be
explained by confounding variables. Furthermore, consideration of structural networks
improved prediction of DD above and beyond demographic and cognitive variables.
Structural covariance networks related to DD overlap with known functional networks
Greater discounting was associated with decreased cortical thickness in multiple
structural networks. Relative to previous reports of both neurofunctional and
neurostructural correlates of delay discounting (Bernhardt et al., 2014; Kable & Levy,
2015; Peters & Büchel, 2011), the effects we observed were fairly widespread across the
brain. Notably, many of the regions encompassed by these networks correspond to
findings from previous studies in adults, including functional networks known to be
involved in DD. As hypothesized, we found associations between DD and CT in central
elements of the valuation network, namely vmPFC (Bartra et al., 2013); the cognitive
control network, including dlPFC (Peters & Büchel, 2011; Stanger et al., 2013); and the
prospection network, involving the medial temporal cortex (Peters & Büchel, 2011).
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While DD and CT relationships have not previously been evaluated in adolescents, one
prior study documented diminished thickness in the ACC and medial PFC in association
with greater DD in adults (Bernhardt et al., 2014). In addition to hypothesized effects, we
also found associations between DD and CT in motor, somatosensory, and both early and
higher-order visual cortices. Notably, when these effects were evaluated jointly in
multivariate model, CT networks enhanced prediction of DD above and beyond
demographic and cognitive variables. This result contributes to efforts in neuroeconomics
to improve prediction of decision-making behavior using brain-based measures obtained
independently of the behavior itself (Kable & Levy, 2015), and suggests that structural
covariance networks may be a useful marker of impulsive choice in youth.
Results converge with data from lesion and neuromodulation studies
Although the negative associations between DD and CT were widespread and
distributed, two structural covariance networks exhibited particularly strong associations
with DD and robustness to all sensitivity analyses. Brain regions comprising these
networks included vmPFC, OFC, temporal pole, and the TPJ. As mentioned above, our
findings in vmPFC were expected based on substantial evidence from fMRI studies that
this brain region is implicated in DD (Ballard & Knutson, 2009; Bartra et al., 2013; Kable
& Glimcher, 2007). Furthermore, activity in vmPFC when merely thinking about the
future predicts DD, such that lower discounters show greater activity when thinking
about the far future (Cooper, Kable, Kim, & Zauberman, 2013). Finally, consistent with
our results, a previous study in adults reported that diminished CT in that region was
associated with higher DD (Bernhardt et al., 2014).
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Beyond the vmPFC, there is evidence that regions including the OFC, temporal
pole, and TPJ are both involved in and necessary for evaluating future outcomes in delay
discounting. First, patients with medial OFC damage show greater discounting of both
primary and secondary rewards, compared to healthy controls and non-frontal damage
patients (Sellitto, Ciaramelli, & di Pellegrino, 2010), and this is the only region where
lesions have been reported to increase discounting in humans. Notably, this relationship
is dose-dependent, such that larger frontal lesions are associated with steeper discounting.
Second, patients with semantic dementia, a disorder characterized by anterior temporal
lobe atrophy, show greater discounting than controls (Chiong et al., 2015). Third, while
the TPJ has typically been implicated in social cognition and theory of mind, recent data
suggests it plays a role in both monetary and social discounting (Soutschek, Ruff,
Strombach, Kalenscher, & Tobler, 2016; Strombach et al., 2015). Importantly, disrupting
the TPJ in healthy adults using transcranial magnetic stimulation increased discounting
(Soutschek et al., 2016). Collectively, this evidence suggests that the disruption of OFC,
anterior temporal lobe, and TPJ may promote impulsive choice.
Associations with delay discounting are independent of age-related changes
While we replicated prior findings of association between lower discounting and
higher IQ (Shamosh & Gray, 2008) and memory performance (Shamosh et al., 2008), we
did not find significant associations between DD and age (Scheres et al., 2006; Steinberg
et al., 2009). This may be due to differences in sample composition, including an older
range being sampled and a dimensional rather than a stratified design that compared older
and younger age groups. Notably, the association between brain structure and DD was
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stable across the entire age range surveyed in our sample. This result is consistent with a
prior study of DD in adolescents and white matter integrity assessed using diffusion
imaging (Olson et al., 2009). Together, these results imply that individual differences in
brain structure associated with impulsive choice do not emerge specifically during
adolescence. These results may also suggest that such individual differences in brain
structure may emerge early in development, consistent with literature describing the
importance of structural brain development in utero, during the peri-natal period, and
during early childhood (Di Martino et al., 2014; Thomason et al., 2013). While
speculative, future research may reveal that individual differences in brain structure
which emerge early in life may impact evolving patterns of value and cognitive control
system function in adolescence which, in turn, may contribute to impulsivity during this
critical period (Bjork, Smith, Chen, & Hommer, 2010; Casey et al., 2008).
Advantages of evaluating structural covariance networks in a large sample
The greater spatial extent of significant associations between brain structure and
DD observed in our data compared to prior results may be due to several aspects of our
study. First, the large sample size afforded greater statistical power, and thus greater
sensitivity to detect effects in multiple brain networks. While the effect sizes of these
associations were small, research documenting inflation of effect sizes in small studies
suggests that the present results are more likely to be an accurate reflection of the true
effect size than data from more modest samples (Button et al., 2013). Second, structural
covariance networks defined by NMF provided a parsimonious summary of the highdimensional imaging data that limited multiple comparisons. In contrast to anatomic
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atlases based on sulcal folding patterns, NMF identifies structural brain networks based
on patterns of covariance in the data itself. The concise summary of the data yielded by
NMF limited multiple comparisons: we only evaluated 19 networks in our analyses, in
contrast to the hundreds of thousands of voxels typically surveyed in mass-univariate
VBM studies. This allowed us to use a rigorous FDR correction for all comparisons,
rather than cluster-based inference that may produce substantial Type I error rates in
many common implementations (Eklund et al., 2016).
Limitations
Certain limitations of this study should be noted. First, the observed effects were
independent of age, suggesting that differences in brain structure associated with
impulsive choice may emerge earlier than the examined age range. Future investigations
should consider longitudinal designs including early childhood to precisely capture the
emergence of these effects. Second, we were unable to directly test the associations with
risky behaviors, such as tobacco, drug use and risky sexual behaviors. Subsequent work
would benefit from the inclusion of such outcome measures and a direct evaluation of
which specific DD-related networks predict increased risk-taking in adolescence. Third,
we used hypothetical instead of real rewards in the DD task. However, prior studies have
yielded similar results between real and hypothetical reward tasks in both behavioral
(Johnson & Bickel, 2002) and functional neuroimaging paradigms (Bickel, Pitcock, Yi,
& Angtuaco, 2009). Fourth, we cannot completely rule out potential confounding
variables which may be correlated with DD. Previous studies have described associations
between CT and SES in adolescence (Mackey et al., 2015), though importantly our
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results remained largely unaffected after controlling for maternal education, a proxy of
SES.
Conclusions and future directions
Understanding impulsive choice in adolescence is important because impulsivity
is associated with a host of risky behaviors and outcomes, such as tobacco use (AudrainMcGovern et al., 2009; Reynolds, 2004), alcohol use (Fernie et al., 2013; Field et al.,
2007), obesity (Fields, Sabet, & Reynolds, 2013) and early sexual initiation (Khurana et
al., 2012), which lead to substantial morbidity and mortality during adolescence.
Leveraging a large developmental sample and advanced analytics, we found that
individual variability in brain structure explains differences in DD in adolescence. Taken
together, our results indicate that higher DD in youth is associated with reduced cortical
thickness in multiple networks, including those known to be essential for valuation.
These results emphasize that risky behaviors in adolescents should be considered in the
context of individual differences of structural brain networks that are present early in life.
Moving forward, such brain-based measures could potentially be used as biomarkers to
identify youth at particularly high risk for negative outcomes, and aid in stratifying youth
within targeted clinical trials that aim to reduce impulsivity and risk-taking behaviors
during this critical period.
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Tables
Table 1. Association between delay discounting and NMF-derived structural
covariance networks. β (unstandardized regression coefficient), SE (β’s standard error),
t (t-value for testing β against 0, dfs = 423), p-value, and FDR-corrected p-value are
obtained from separate general additive models run for each network. In this model,
discount rate (log k) predicts cortical thickness scores, controlling for age (fit as a
penalized spline) and sex. In order to provide an estimate of the effect size, r is the partial
Pearson’s correlation coefficient between discount rate and CT scores in each network,
while adjusting for linear age, quadratic age, and sex. FDR-significant p-values are
indicated in bold.

Network

ß

SE

t

p

FDR-p

r

Ntwk 1

-0.649

0.3946

-1.64

0.101

0.137

-0.080

Ntwk 2

-0.0138

0.4217

-0.03

0.974

0.974

0.002

Ntwk 3

-1.5868

0.5606

-2.83

0.005

0.019

-0.136

Ntwk 4

-0.4337

0.6414

-0.68

0.499

0.527

-0.033

Ntwk 5

-0.9959

0.4811

-2.07

0.039

0.062

-0.100

Ntwk 6

-0.8277

0.5337

-1.55

0.122

0.154

-0.075

Ntwk 7

-1.1428

0.4359

-2.62

0.009

0.024

-0.126

Ntwk 8

-1.1598

0.4562

-2.54

0.011

0.024

-0.123

Ntwk 9

-0.7926

0.3580

-2.21

0.027

0.047

-0.110

Ntwk 10

-0.3748

0.3055

-1.23

0.221

0.262

-0.060

Ntwk 11

-1.1527

0.4669

-2.47

0.014

0.027

-0.119

Ntwk 12

-1.5839

0.6164

-2.57

0.011

0.024

-0.124

Ntwk 13

-1.173

0.4283

-2.74

0.006

0.02

-0.132

Ntwk 14

-2.019

0.4241

-4.76

<0.0001

<0.0001

-0.225

Ntwk 15

-1.257

0.3036

-4.14

<0.0001

<0.0001

-0.200

Ntwk 16

-0.4404

0.4371

-1.01

0.314

0.351

-0.050

Ntwk 18

-1.252

0.4305

-2.91

0.004

0.018

-0.140

Ntwk 19

-0.7172

0.3713

-1.93

0.054

0.079

-0.094

Ntwk 20

-0.8778

0.3014

-2.91

0.004

0.018

-0.140

!
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Figures

Figure 1. Schematic of non-negative matrix factorization and example data for each
matrix. X is the original matrix with a sample of actual cortical thickness data; Sample
CT map shows example CT data from one participant, and corresponds to a column in the
X matrix; B is matrix with a sample of actual estimated networks and their loadings on
each voxel; Loadings map shows example loadings from one network in NMF solution
used in our analyses, and corresponds to a column in the B matrix; C is a matrix with
actual subject-specific weights for each network; Histogram shows CT Scores in same
sample network as visualized in B, and corresponds to a row in the C matrix. Matrix sizes
are shown with following dimensions: V = number of cortical thickness voxels, N =
number of participants; K = number of networks.
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Figure 2. NMF reconstruction error identifies 20 cortical networks as the optimal
parcellation resolution for cortical thickness data. Plot of reconstruction error gradient
for NMF at multiple resolutions; the gradient is the difference in reconstruction error as
the NMF solution increases by 2 networks. Blue circle indicates selected NMF solution
of 20 networks.
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Ntwk 1

Ntwk 2

Ntwk 3

Ntwk 4

Ntwk 5

Ntwk 6

Ntwk 7

Ntwk 8

Ntwk 9

Ntwk 10

Ntwk 11

Ntwk 12

Ntwk 13

Ntwk 14

Ntwk 15

Ntwk 16

Ntwk 17

Ntwk 18

Ntwk 19

Ntwk 20

Figure 3. Structural covariance networks delineated by NMF. Visualization of
structural covariance networks from the 20-network NMF solution. The spatial
distribution of each network is indicated by loadings at each voxel in arbitrary units (from
B matrix in NMF factorization); warmer colors represent higher loadings. For each
network, we show one view that best captures the main area(s) of coverage. Approximate
anatomical coverage of each structural covariance network: 1) medial prefrontal cortex
and cingulate cortex; 2) medial temporal lobe; 3) insula; 4) medial posterior parietal
cortex, including the precuneus; 5) temporo-occipital cortex; 6) dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (dlPFC); 7) fusiform gyrus; 8) lateral temporal lobe; 9) lateral temporal lobe and
temporal pole; 10) posterior cingulate cortex and temporal lobe; 11) frontal and parietal
cortex, including primary motor and somatosensory cortices; 12) occipital cortex; 13)
medial temporal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and posterior cingulate cortex
(PCC); 14) orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), frontal and temporal poles; 15) ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), inferior temporal lobe, auditory cortex, temporoparietal
junction (TPJ); 16) dorsal OFC; 17) the dura matter, a noise component that was not
evaluated further; 18) dlPFC; 19) angular and supramarginal gyri; 20) posterior inferior
temporal lobe.
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Figure 4. Higher discounting is associated with diminished cortical thickness in
frontal, temporal, and parietal areas. Regions of FDR-significant association between
log k and structural covariance networks. The composite network visualization was
obtained by assigning each voxel to the network which had the highest loading for that
voxel (from the B matrix), across all 19 networks. Maximal effects were observed in
Networks 14 and 15, which included orbitorfrontal cortex and ventromedial prefrontal
cortex. Scatterplots for log k-CT association in these networks are shown, while adjusting
for model covariates. Gray envelope represents the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 5. Association between cortical thickness and delay discounting is
independent of age. Scatterplots for relationship between age and CT in networks 14 and
15, separated by top (Q4) and bottom (Q1) quartiles of log k. The Q4 quartile group
contains participants with the most impulsive preferences. For each quartile, the age-CT
relationship is shown after adjusting for model covariates, and includes the 95%
confidence intervals (gray envelopes).
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Figure 6. CT data from structural covariance networks predicts delay discounting.
Scatterplot for relationship between actual log k values and predicted log k from
multivariate CT prediction. Multivariate prediction is based on CT scores from all
structural covariance networks plus demographic variables, sex, and age. Scatterplots
include line of best fit for this association with a 95% confidence interval (gray
envelope).
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CHAPTER 4 — General discussion
Overall summary
The research presented in this dissertation furthers our understanding of
individual differences in two types of decision-making: adaptive learning (Chapter 2) and
delay discounting (Chapter 3). Results presented in Chapter 2 showed that individuals
across the lifespan exhibit large variability in using normative learning strategies in a
dynamic environment, and these differences relate to cognitive, but not personality,
factors. Specifically, better memory performance was associated with more “adaptive”
learning, in both young (age 18-35, Experiment 3) and elderly (age 60+, Experiment 2)
participants. In addition, adaptive learning in elderly adults was less influenced by
uncertainty, but also less influenced by a non-normative reward factor. Reliance on
normative learning factors has previously been associated with neural activity in the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), lateral prefrontal cortex (lPFC), and medial
temporal lobe, among other regions (McGuire, Nassar, Gold, & Kable, 2014). Next, we
directly investigated the neural bases of delay discounting and found structural effects in
some of these regions. Results presented in Chapter 3 showed that cortical thickness
across multiple networks of brain regions was associated with individual differences in
delay discounting in a large sample of adolescents. Specifically, diminished cortical
thickness in frontal and temporal regions was associated with higher discounting, i.e.,
more impulsive choices. The strongest effects were found in regions typically implicated
in delay discounting, such as the vmPFC and orbitofrontal cortex. Furthermore, cortical
thickness data predicted differences in delay discounting above and beyond cognitive
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variables typically found to correlate with delay discounting. Broader implications and
future directions of this research are discussed below.
Influences of cognitive factors and arousal on adaptive learning
In Chapter 2, across three experiments, adaptive learning behavior, and
specifically the degree of reliance on normative learning factors, was positively
associated with cognitive abilities— memory and IQ— but not personality. Notably,
there were no clear links between learning and personality traits related to affective
arousal, e.g., anxiety and neuroticism, even though arousal has been shown to play a role
in adaptive learning. Prior work with a simpler version of the predictive-inference task
reported that arousal sensitivity to task statistics, as measured by pupillary responses,
reflects behavioral sensitivity to normative learning factors (Nassar et al., 2012).
Specifically, the degree to which pupil diameter tracks normative learning factors
predicts learning rates across participants. Pupil dilation is considered a marker of
affective arousal (Bradley, Miccoli, Escrig, & Lang, 2008; Partala & Surakka, 2003), and
its response to emotionally arousing stimuli can be modulated by anxiety (Bertrand,
Garcia, Viera, Santos, & Bertrand, 2013) and neuroticism (Prehn et al., 2008). However,
in addition to being an indicator of affective arousal states, pupil diameter has also been
linked to both state and trait cognitive characteristics. For example, pupil diameter tracks
the amount of material being processed in memory (Kahneman & Beatty, 1966), and
baseline pupil diameter is positively correlated with working memory capacity across
individuals (Heitz, Schrock, Payne, & Engle, 2008). Furthermore, pupil dilation while
performing cognitive tasks is associated with intelligence (Ahern & Beatty, 1979; Van
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Der Meer et al., 2010), such that higher intelligence contributes to more efficient
cognitive processing or better access to cognitive resources. Given pupil diameter’s
associations with cognitive abilities and processing, the link between our findings and
previous findings of pupil-linked arousal’s influence on adaptive learning (Nassar et al.,
2012) is intriguing. Is the role of arousal in adaptive learning reflective of cognitive or
affective influences on normative learning? Future work is needed to characterize the
interplay of cognitive abilities and arousal in this task. Specifically, it would be
interesting to measure cognitive abilities (memory and intelligence) and arousal in the
same setting, and test whether cognitive abilities modulate arousal in response to
environmental statistics. This work could also be replicated and extended by using
alternative measures of arousal, such as galvanic skin response and heart rate variability.
The role of memory in value-based decision-making
The data presented in this dissertation point to memory as an important source of
individual differences in decision-making. In the adaptive learning framework (Chapter
2), better memory performance, across different age groups and different memory tasks,
was associated with higher reliance on normative learning factors. In the study of
adolescent delay discounting (Chapter 3), we replicated a prior association with memory
(Shamosh et al., 2008), while also using a different memory task (tapping episodic versus
working memory). Recent integrative work has begun to focus on the relationship
between memory and value-based decision-making— two research domains that have
mostly been studied in isolation of each other (Euston, Gruber, & McNaughton, 2012;
Shadlen & Shohamy, 2016; Weilbächer & Gluth, 2016). Episodic memory, including
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encoding and retrieval of such memories, is most often associated with the medial
temporal lobe, and specifically the hippocampus (Eichenbaum, 2004). In contrast, valuebased decision-making is robustly associated, in part, with the vmPFC, where neural
activity in fMRI experiments tracks the subjective value of choice stimuli (Bartra,
McGuire, & Kable, 2013; Clithero & Rangel, 2013). A recent review article by Shadlen
and Shohamy (2016) argues that many value-based decisions entail sequential sampling
of evidence from memory until a decision threshold is reached, even for decisions where
the choices need not be retrieved from memory. The authors hypothesize that this
sequential process is implemented via an interaction between vmPFC and hippocampus,
where the hippocampus “updates” a decision variable encoded in vmPFC. Furthermore,
in their view, memory is particularly important to value-based decisions that depend
either on the integration of distinct past events or on prospection about future events.
Accordingly, the data presented herein fit into this framework in two ways.
First, in the adaptive learning study, a plausible explanation for the effect of
memory ability on normative learning would be that retrieving past outcomes is
necessary for gradually building a mental model of the environment (akin to model-based
learning). Related to the above-proposed framework (Shadlen & Shohamy, 2016),
uncertainty updating in the helicopter task is reliant on activity in both medial temporal
lobe and vmPFC (McGuire et al., 2014). In healthy aging, both of these regions may
become less “sensitive” because of age-related dopamine receptor loss (Mohr, Li, &
Heekeren, 2010; Kaasinen et al., 2000) or brain volume atrophy (Coffey et al., 1992),
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which may explain differences in uncertainty updating between young and old
participants in this study.
Second, in delay discounting, episodic memory could play a role through its
relation to prospection, i.e., episodic future thinking. Indeed, much research has shown
that the cognitive processes of remembering past events and imagining possible future
events are related, and are dependent on a similar network of brain regions, including the
hippocampus and medial prefrontal cortex (for a review, see Schacter, Addis, & Buckner,
2008). In the context of delay discounting, previous work has shown an explicit link
between past and future, where individuals discount events into the past to a similar
degree as they discount events into the future, and both discounting phenomena exhibit
similar characteristics (Yi, Gatchalian, & Bickel, 2006; Yi, Landes, & Bickel, 2009).
Moreover, episodic thinking about the future has been identified as one of several
cognitive processes implicated in delay discounting (Peters and Büchel, 2011). Similarly
to the proposed mechanism of memory’s role in value-based decision-making (Shadlen &
Shohamy, 2016), prospection can reduce discounting through a functional interaction
between hippocampus and medial prefrontal cortex (Peters & Büchel, 2010). Notably,
although the connection between structure and function in these areas is unclear, cortical
thickness in both medial prefrontal and, to a lesser extent, medial temporal areas was
negatively associated with discounting, but we did not specifically test if episodic
memory is at all related to these structural effects.
More broadly, combined results from both studies contribute to a growing body of
work showing that memory is important in value-based decision making. To the extent
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that lower discounting and more adaptive learning in changing environments are
desirable, better memory appears to confer additional benefits to individuals.
Memory versus IQ effects
In addition to memory effects, results from the adaptive learning study pointed to
intelligence as another cognitive factor that predicts normative learning (although the
effect was found in only one of the experiments). In the delay discounting study, higher
intelligence was associated with lower discounting, as has been previously established
(Shamosh & Gray, 2008). Intelligence is construed as a general factor that contributes to
a variety of cognitive tasks, and is highly positively correlated with both episodic and
working memory, but many have argued that intelligence and memory are distinct
constructs (Ackerman, Beier, & Boyle, 2005; Conway, Kane, & Engle, 2003; Healey,
Crutchley, & Kahana, 2014). Given this association and the finding that both constructs
may contribute to decision-making, the question arises whether these effects are specific
to one of the constructs or, alternatively, indicative of general effects of superior
cognitive functioning. In the adaptive learning framework, we were unable to
conclusively answer this question. Future experiments could address this distinction
between specific memory versus intelligence effects or general cognitive effects in at
least two ways.
A possible experiment with lesion patients can provide causal evidence. Performance of
hippocampal patients with memory impairments can be compared to that of healthy
controls, and a group with dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) lesions. dlPFC is a core
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part of a network of regions supporting intelligence (Gläscher et al., 2010; Kane & Engle,
2002). If one of the lesion groups shows a larger impairment relative to the healthy
controls, that would suggest that the related process has a primary influence on normative
learning. Future work will also benefit from using samples of individuals who are more
representative of the average population in terms of cognitive abilities, thus increasing
variability and limiting ceiling effects. Understanding the specific cognitive processes
that underlie adaptive learning could contribute to designing interventions targeted at
improving decision-making in dynamic environments.
Brain-as-predictor approach
An important extension of the work described in Chapter 3 would be to use brain
data to predict real-life outcomes; specifically, using cortical thickness networks related
to delay discounting to predict risk-taking behavior in adolescents. As mentioned
previously, high impulsivity, operationalized as steep discounting, has been linked to a
host of maladaptive behaviors and outcomes, in both adolescents and adults. It is thus
plausible that structure of brain regions implicated in delay discounting may be
associated with these behaviors. This approach of utilizing fundamental neuroscience
findings that identify neural bases of psychological processes for the prediction of reallife outcomes that are related to these processes has been termed the “brain-as-predictor”
approach (Berkman & Falk, 2013). More broadly, improved prediction of human
economic behavior from neural data has been one of the goals of the field of
neuroeconomics (Kable & Levy, 2015).
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Using neural data directly to predict real-life outcomes can be beneficial to the
extent that it (1) explains variability that has not been accounted for by behavioral or selfreport measures, especially for measures that are subject to considerable measurement
noise; and (2) elucidates specific sub-processes or mechanisms that are associated with
the real-life outcome (Berkman & Falk, 2013). For example, we found that cortical
thickness in several brain regions associated with distinct cognitive processes is
associated with delay discounting, but it is unclear if these processes contribute to risktaking behavior equally. If successful, a future study showing that brain structure in these
networks of regions directly predicts risk-taking in adolescence offers the promise of a
fundamental neuroscience contribution to the field of public health. Prediction can
potentially be further improved by adding other brain measures that carry a signal related
to delay discounting, and potentially combining structural and functional data, as has
previously been done in predicting intelligence (Choi et al., 2008).
Decision-making across the lifespan
Age is an important factor in the research presented in this dissertation. Stages of
life such as adolescence and old age are accompanied by significant changes in brain
structure (Buckner, 2004; Coffey et al., 1992; Giedd et al., 1999; Lenroot et al., 2007;
Raz et al., 2005) and cognitive abilities (Blakemore & Choudhury, 2006; MacPherson,
Phillips, & Della Sala, 2002; McArdle, Ferrer-Caja, Hamagami, & Woodcock, 2002),
which could play a role in individual differences in decision-making. Results from the
adaptive learning study (Chapter 2) showed that older adults used learning strategies that
were less influenced by a normative learning factor related to uncertainty, compared to
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younger adults. This finding contributes to a large literature showing age-related
differences in both laboratory (Mata, Josef, Samanez‐Larkin, & Hertwig, 2011;
Samanez‐Larkin & Knutson, 2015; Tymula, Belmaker, Ruderman, Glimcher, & Levy,
2013) and real-life decision-making (Finucane, Slovic, Hibbard, Peters, Mertz, &
MacGregor, 2002; Thornton & Dumke, 2005). More specifically, since increased
learning from uncertainty in the helicopter task is in part associated with higher BOLD
activity in lPFC (McGuire et al., 2014), our findings are consistent with a report that
older adults are impaired on tasks dependent on dlPFC function (MacPherson et al.,
2002). The delay discounting study (Chapter 3) was specifically focused on adolescents
because of the important neurostructural changes during this developmental period and
the increased risk of impulsive behaviors and outcomes that are associated with higher
discounting. In a large adolescent sample, cortical thickness associations with delay
discounting showed some similarities with findings in adults, including neurostructural
and neurofunctional findings in vmPFC, OFC, and ACC (Bernhardt et al., 2014; Bjork,
Momenan, & Hommer, 2009; Kable & Glimcher, 2007; Sellitto, Ciaramelli, & di
Pellegrino, 2010), among other regions. Yet, future studies will be required to directly
test if the same cortical thickness networks are associated with delay discounting in
adults.
Conclusion
Decision-making is ubiquitous in life and humans show large variability in
choices they make and what decision-making strategies they use. The research presented
here focused on two domains of decision-making and investigated factors that explain
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differences between individuals. Across two studies, evidence showed that cognitive
function, age, and brain structure are important factors to consider when studying
decision-making. Understanding the factors that drive differences in decision-making is
important, so as to design training for more advantageous decision-making.
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